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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the sea level rises, the boundaries between privately owned coastal 
property and sovereign submerged lands held in public trust are becoming 
increasingly contested.1 The common law doctrines that determine these 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 
1106 (Fla. 2008) (involving a boundary dispute between private property owners and Walton County 
arising out of efforts to re-nourish beaches critically eroded by a hurricane); Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 703 (2010) (affirming the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision); see also Deborah Wheeler, Beach Access Debate Continues to Be a Hot 
Topic, WALTON SUN (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:00 PM) [hereinafter Beach Access], 
http://www.waltonsun.com/article/20160323/NEWS/160329713 (chronicling citizens’ concerns over 
their rights to use the beach); Deborah Wheeler, Attorney Retained in Walton Beach Access 
Controversy, NW. FLA. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:09 AM) [hereinafter Attorney Retained], 
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20160413/attorney-retained-in-walton-beach-access-
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boundaries under conditions of change—primarily accretion, erosion, 
reliction, and avulsion—have important implications for all those involved 
in adaptation planning along our coasts.2 This includes private owners of 
coastal property, local government officials seeking to develop and 
implement adaptation strategies, beachgoers seeking to use shrinking 
beaches, beach-tourism-dependent businesses, and courts facing cases 
involving boundary disputes at the water’s moving edge.3 This paper raises 
the questions of whether and how the common law doctrines remain 
relevant and applicable in an era of sea-level rise. 
These doctrines create a legal framework that is problematic even 
without sea-level rise. Commentators justly criticize these doctrines for 
being vague,4 lacking a coherent justification,5 being inefficient,6 and 
                                                                                                                 
controversy (stating that conflict over boundaries often arises in the context of disputes over public 
rights to use the dry sand beach). Litigation over these rights is also becoming increasingly common. 
See, e.g., Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing a 
dispute between littoral landowner and county over public use after erosion reduced a dry-sand beach 
area); Reynolds v. County of Volusia, 659 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a 
dispute over county right to regulate beach); Lizette Alvarez, Florida Beachgoers Cling to a Right to 
Make the Sand Their Driveway, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/us/ 
florida-beachgoers-cling-to-a-right-to-make-the-sand-their-driveway.html (chronicling legal battles in 
Florida over public access to beaches). 
 2. See generally Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of 
Riparian and Littoral Title Problem, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL L. 265, 275–82 (1991) 
(explaining in depth the doctrines associated with the movement of water and their subsequent effects 
on shoreline titles). 
 3. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 1091, 1106 (2011) (discussing rising litigation between private coastal owners and the 
government); Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 
38 (2009) (discussing financial dynamics of coastal property and beaches for the government). 
 4. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 351 (2010) [hereinafter Sax, Accretion]; David Rusk, Fix It or Forget It: How the 
Doctrine of Avulsion Threatens the Efficacy of Rolling Easements, 51 HOUSTON L. REV. 297, 323–24 
(2013); Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in Coastal Texas: 
Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 391 (2011); 
see also Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Tex. 2012) (Medina, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court’s vague distinction between gradual and sudden or slight and dramatic changes to the coastline 
jeopardizes the public’s right to free and open beaches . . . .”). 
 5. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351; Rusk, supra note 4, at 325–26; see also Joseph L. 
Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. 
J. ENVTL. L. 641, 645 (2010) [hereinafter Sax, Rising Sea Levels] (explaining how the doctrine could be 
interpreted as unreasonable). 
 6. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351; Christie, supra note 3, at 54 (alluding to the factors 
that result in inefficient methods); see also McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 392 (explaining that property 
owners’ efforts to rebuild will lead to inefficient public response to disaster and expensive litigation); 9 
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 66.02[1] nn.1–2, 4 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2016) (discussing the challenge of proving the factual prerequisites). 
92 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:089 
tending to create uncertainty.7 They have pointed out that the primary 
distinction the doctrines draw—between changes that are slow and 
imperceptible and those that are rapid and observable—creates heavy 
evidentiary demands with little benefit, and is ill matched to a reality where 
many changes reflect a combination of rapid and slow processes.8 Further, 
commentators have suggested that the doctrines do not serve social values 
well, particularly in an era of sea-level rise.9 These critiques and the 
reforms proposed by the commentators are valuable contributions; over 
time, courts may take note of these concerns. However, real property law is 
a field well known for its archaism and the slow pace at which courts 
typically adopt change.10 The courts’ conservatism about property law is 
amplified by their concern about upsetting landowners’ expectations 
without notice or fair process, which the specter of a judicial takings theory 
heightens.11 
This paper approaches these doctrines from a different perspective: a 
perspective focused specifically on their application in an era of sea-level 
rise. It asks whether, on their own terms, these doctrines apply to cases 
involving coastal property in an era of documented and ongoing sea-level 
rise. Building on the insights of other legal scholars who have explored and 
challenged traditional thinking about these doctrines, this paper asks 
whether sea-level rise so changes material, doctrinally relevant facts that 
cases arising along our coasts today are distinguishable from cases in prior 
eras.12 The doctrines of accretion, erosion, reliction, and avulsion developed 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Christie, supra note 3, at 54 (highlighting the reasons for uncertainty in the existing 
legal framework); see also Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 735 (Medina, J., dissenting) (“But the exact metes 
and bounds of the beachfront property line cannot be ascertained with any specificity at any given time 
other than by reference to the mean high tide.”); Rusk, supra note 4, at 323. 
 8. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645; McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 382–83; Rusk, 
supra note 4, at 326–27. 
 9. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645; Rusk, supra note 4 at 325 (suggesting that 
application of the doctrine of avulsion jeopardizes public access to beaches); Sax,  Accretion, supra note 
4, at 356; Christie, supra note 3, at 48–52 (critiquing the Florida Supreme Court for misapplying the 
ambulatory boundaries framework in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.). 
 10. A primary justification for this is the theory that a primary goal of property law is to 
promote stability. See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. 
REV. 463, 466 (2007) (surveying theories of property as a tool to promote stability). 
 11. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S 702, 713–14 
(2010) (plurality opinion supporting application of the Takings Clause to judicial decisions). 
 12. See Lovett, supra note 10, at 469, 470 (providing a detailed exploration of the relative 
capacity of different property relationships to respond to radically changed circumstances). Lovett 
defines radically changed circumstances to include events that are sudden, unexpected, intensely 
disruptive, and geographically pervasive. Id. at 470–73. As Part II makes clear, the changes this paper 
focuses on may not qualify as either sudden or unexpected.  Using Hurricane Katrina as a case study, 
Lovett proposes normative criteria for evaluating the resilience of property relationships, including 
landlord-tenant and mortgagor-mortgagee. Id. at 495, 496, 515. The normative criteria he proposes for 
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from and were applied in cases from prior eras. It argues that the factual 
differences between the historic context and the conditions along our coasts 
today demand that courts take account of these changes as they apply the 
law governing coastal boundaries.13 
After laying out the contours of the relevant common law doctrines and 
the rationales offered to support their application, the article identifies four 
factual assumptions underlying the application of these doctrines. It goes on 
to show that these assumptions are no longer true. These doctrines have 
always dealt with dynamic water bodies, but sea-level rise changes the 
dynamic coastal environment in four materially important ways.14 This 
article describes how the facts that characterize the context of sea-level rise 
differ from those at all prior times in modern history. It then examines how 
these factual differences affect whether and how each of the five principal 
rationales underlying these common law doctrines remain applicable. It 
concludes that the foundations for applying the ambulatory boundaries 
framework have been so undermined in the context of sea-level rise that 
courts should reconsider the application of this body of law to cases 
involving coastal erosion. It then offers two approaches that courts might 
use to adapt the law to the new realities. 
                                                                                                                 
evaluating resilience include whether, under conditions of radical change, the regimes: (1) encourage 
parties to spread risk and to enlist outside resources; (2) offer economies of scale; (3) facilitate exit for 
those needing or wishing to exit in ways that promote trust and cooperation; (4) facilitate entrance for 
others; and (5) spread access to common resources more widely and equitably. Id. at 496. One could 
analyze the rule governing the relationship between coastal landowners and the sovereign using these 
criteria. 
 13. This project bears some relationship to the growing literature exploring whether and how 
statutory law should adapt to deal with a changing climate. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change 
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 392–96 (2010) 
[hereinafter Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation] (explaining how environmental sciences have evolved in 
response to climate change and how environmental law must now do the same); J.B. Ruhl, Climate 
Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1374, 1374 (2008) [hereinafter Ruhl, Structural Transformation] (arguing that resilience and adaptive 
capacity are the keys to a legal system well adapted to intense and long-term demands brought about by 
climate change); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends Without Breaking, 2 
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 46–48 (2010) (suggesting that less rigid environmental laws 
may lead to greater advances in climate change adaptation); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a 
Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 273–74 
(2012) (outlining policy responses to advance climate change adaptation solutions). The significant 
difference is that this article focuses on common law doctrines rather than statutory law. As Professor 
Ruhl points out in an article focused on making the legal system itself adaptive, the common law 
possesses a unique evolutionary capacity. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and 
Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1373, 1381 (2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, General Design Principles] (offering examples of changes in the 
doctrine of nuisance in response to evolving understanding of the value of wetlands). 
 14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that climate change has rendered four assumptions of the 
ambulatory boundaries framework untrue). 
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Using Florida law as an illustration, Part I of this paper sets forth the 
constitutional and common law that governs littoral property rights and 
defines those lands protected by the public trust as sovereign submerged 
lands. Florida is a state with a particularly high stake because of the length 
of its coastline,15 the significant effects it is already experiencing,16 the 
unique challenges it faces in responding to sea-level rise,17 and its beach-
tourism-dependent economy.18 Moreover, although each state’s law is 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Florida has 8,436 miles of coastline, surpassed only by Alaska. See NOAA, OFF. FOR 
COASTAL MGMT., GENERAL COASTLINE AND SHORELINE MILEAGE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). Of these, 825 miles 
are sand beaches. Why Beach Restoration, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., 
https://floridadep.gov/wra/beaches-funding/content/why-beach-restoration (last updated Sept. 7, 2017). 
Seventy-five percent of Florida’s population lives in coastal counties, and these counties generate 79% 
of the state’s economic activity. Nathalie Baptiste, That Sinking Feeling: The Politics of Sea Level Rise 
and Miami’s Building Boom, THE AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 19, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/sinking-
feeling-politics-sea-level-rise-and-miamis-building-boom. 
 16. GARY T. MITCHUM, FLA. CLIMATE INST., SEA LEVEL CHANGES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN 
UNITED STATES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 5, 9 (2011), http://floridaclimateinstitute.org/images/rep
orts/201108mitchum_sealevel.pdf. Reports in the popular press have highlighted in particular the 
problem often called vertical or “sunny day” flooding associated with monthly high tides or spring tides. 
See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami, NEW YORKER, Dec. 21 & 28, 2015, at 42, 45 
(reporting that Florida suffers from three significant effects of global climate change: sea-level rise, 
higher water tables, and extreme weather events).   
 17. The karst geology that produces vertical flooding limits the efficacy of seawalls, dikes, and 
other structures designed to keep water out along much of the coast. The damaging storm surges 
associated with the hurricanes to which Florida is vulnerable amplify the erosion caused by sea-level 
rise. The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Compact has estimated that, in Southeast Florida alone, as 
much as $4 billion worth of real estate value will be inundated at one foot of sea-level rise, and as much 
as $31 billion of value will be inundated at three feet of sea-level rise. SE. FLA. CLIMATE COMPACT 
CTYS., A REGION RESPONDS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 9–10 (2012), 
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org//wp-content/uploads/2014/09/regional-climate-action-
plan-final-ada-compliant.pdf. ClimateCentral estimates that 2.4 million people and 1.3 million homes 
are within four feet elevation of the mean high water line in Florida. Ben Strauss, Florida and the Rising 
Sea, SURGING SEAS, http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/news/floria-and-the-rising-sea (last visited Nov. 
30, 2017). 
 18. Tourism spending in Florida in 2015 amounted to $89.1 billion, generating $5.3 billion in 
tax revenue. An estimated 1.2 million Florida residents were employed by the tourism industry as of 
early 2016. Will Seccombe, Florida Tourism Generated $89.1 Billion in Economic Impact in 2015, 
SUNSHINE MATTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 11:40 AM) [hereinafter Florida Tourism], 
http://www.visitfloridablog.org/?p=15486. An estimated 106,585,000 tourists visited Florida in 2015. 
Id. A substantial portion of these visits Florida’s beaches. See FLA. TAX WATCH, INVESTING IN 
TOURISM: ANALYZING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXPANDING FLORIDA TOURISM 4 (2013), 
http://floridataxwatch.org/resources/p df/2013TourismFINAL.pdf. (“[A] 2011 Visit Florida Study found 
that 40 percent of all U.S. visitors [to Florida] reported beach and waterfront activities as one of their top 
activities when visiting Florida.”). Compared to the total 82.6 million tourism visitors in 2010, the seven 
leading Florida theme parks (four Walt Disney World, two Universal, and Busch Gardens) had a total of 
33 million visitors. Christopher Thompson, Florida Tourism Industry Welcomed 82.6 Million Visitors in 
2010, SUNSHINE MATTERS (Feb. 16, 2011, 1:16 PM), www.visitfloridablog.org/?p=1573; Ray 
Oldakowski, Florida’s Tourism Industry, AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS NEWSLETTER (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://news.aag.org/2013/11/floridas-tourism-industry/; see also CATANESE CTR., FLA. ATL. UNIV., 
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unique, the broad contours of Florida’s doctrine are similar to those of 
many other coastal states.19 Thus, the analysis can be readily adapted to 
apply to other coastal states as well.20 Drawing in part on the historical 
work done by Professor Sax, Part I closes by identifying the five primary 
rationales that justify application of the ambulatory boundaries framework: 
(1) de minimis non curat lex; (2) fairness; (3) protection of the public 
interest; (4) social utility/productivity of land; and (5) protection of littoral 
landowners’ access to water.21 
Part II identifies four doctrinally significant factual predicates for 
application of these doctrines that are absent in an era of sea-level rise.22 
Unlike the historic change experienced along coastlines, sea-level rise is 
predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, geographically pervasive along the 
coast, and generally restricted to coastal areas.23 Both the changed physical 
reality associated with sea-level rise and the impact these changed facts 
have on the rationales for the common law framework undermine the legal 
justification for applying these rules in areas affected by sea-level rise. 
Based on this analysis, the article suggests that in cases arising in an 
era of documented and scientifically predictable sea-level rise, common law 
courts should take account of the changed facts. In Part III, the paper 
presents two distinct approaches courts might take to adapt the law to the 
new coastal realities. 
The first, more limited approach that courts might adopt is to continue 
applying the ambulatory boundaries framework while taking explicit 
account of the realities associated with sea-level rise. Courts might also 
consider how these realities affect the rationales underlying the ambulatory 
boundaries framework. In this approach, courts would continue to apply the 
doctrines, but better align their application with rationales that remain 
relevant in the context of predictable, ongoing, and pervasive sea-level rise. 
The second, more comprehensive approach is to clear the debris of the 
ambulatory boundaries framework. This would leave two primary bodies of 
directly relevant law: (1) the law governing real property boundary 
                                                                                                                 
ECONOMICS OF BEACH TOURISM IN FLORIDA (2005), https://www.dep.state.fl.us/beaches/publications/ 
pdf/phase2.pdf (describing the importance of the tourism industry in Florida). 
 19. See Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public 
Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 109–19 (2011) (providing 
a useful summary of state legal doctrines related to public trust and littoral rights and a chart 
highlighting the areas of similarity and difference). 
 20. See id. (analogizing the summary to fit other coastal states).  
 21. See infra Part I.D (discussing rationales for ambulatory boundaries). 
 22. See infra Part II (discussing four factual assumptions: predictability; directionality; 
frequency and scope; and homogeneity of water bodies). 
 23. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645. 
96 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:089 
determinations and boundary and ownership changes; and (2) the law 
governing submerged lands and protecting the public trust.24 The 
ambulatory boundaries framework has historically supplanted this law and 
thus avoided the need to mediate the tension between them.25 However, this 
analysis suggests that courts can mediate this tension directly and 
effectively by removing the distorting impact of the archaic ambulatory 
boundaries framework. 
Part III sketches how a court adopting either approach would analyze a 
boundary question, and identifies some of the critiques and concerns that 
each approach raises. 
I. BEACH LAW: WHERE SOVEREIGNTY LANDS MEET LITTORAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
The law of public and private property rights at the coastline will 
certainly become a more frequent and contentious battleground as the sea 
level rises and state and local governments respond to the resulting and 
anticipated changes.26 The uncertainty that surrounds property boundaries 
at the sea’s edge, even without sea-level rise, makes coastal property rights 
a difficult and contentious terrain.27 The relatively high value of coastal 
property and the near certainty of coastal erosion make litigation over the 
private owners’ rights and claims more likely.28 
Erosion already affects a substantial part of Florida’s coastline.29 
Almost half of the linear extent of Florida’s beaches have already been 
designated “critically eroded” and, therefore, eligible for restoration and 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See infra Part III (expanding on doctrinal implications of sea-level rise). 
 25. See generally Lear, supra note 2, at 265 (explaining the history of riparian boundaries and 
how the framework has worked in place of land being put under public trust). 
 26. Doremus, supra note 3, at 1105–10. 
 27. Id. at 1105, 1109. 
 28. Id. at 1105–06. See, e.g., Deborah Wheeler, Walton Commission Votes in Favor of Public 
Beach Access, NW. FLA. DAILY NEWS [hereinafter Wheeler, Walton Comm’n], 
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20161026/walton-commission-votes-in-favor-of-public-beach-
access (last updated Oct. 26, 2016) (highlighting the contention between a customary use ordinance and 
private property rights); CNN Wire Staff, Beachfront Homeowners Lose at Supreme Court, CNN (June 
17, 2010, 5:22PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/06/17/scotus.property/index.html (detailing that 
“[t]he homeowners [in arguing Stop the Beach Renourishment] told the court the difference between 
beachfront and ‘beach view’—from an aesthetic and financial point of view—is tremendous when 
property values are considered.”). 
 29. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Critically Eroded Beaches in Florida 4 (August 2016) 
[hereinafter Critically Eroded], https://floridadep.gov/sites/default/files/CriticalErosionReport.pdf 
(reporting 411.2 miles of Florida’s beaches as critically eroded and 93.5 miles as non-critically eroded).  
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nourishment under the state beach management program.30 In developed 
areas, many private landowners are facing a one-way trend of erosion that 
may entail the loss of property and ultimately jeopardize any structures on 
the property.31 Florida’s beaches face an uncertain future; both their 
existence and the public’s right to enjoy those that survive are at risk. 
Historically, there have been conflicts about property boundaries and 
the application of statutes, the public trust doctrine, and other common law 
principles to Florida’s beaches and beach-adjacent lands and waters.32 
However, perhaps because the conflicts were the exception rather than the 
rule, most of those who have a stake in Florida’s beaches—coastal 
landowners, beach-tourism-dependent businesses, state and local 
government agencies, and even members of the public who use the 
beaches—could afford to be somewhat lax in their understanding of the 
scope of the various parties’ rights and duties.33 Moreover, because of the 
dynamic nature of the coastline and coastal property boundaries, property 
owners and members of the beach-going public are frequently unaware of 
the location of the littoral property boundary at any given time.34 Even if 
they fully understand the legal and factual basis for determining where the 
boundary lies and the circumstances under which it might change, applying 
                                                                                                                 
 30. As of 2016, 61% of Florida beaches (504.7 miles of 825 total miles) were eroding: 411.2 
miles were critically eroded and 93.5 non-critically eroded. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 29. 
Since 1998, the state has spent $626.6 million under its cost-sharing program for local and federally 
authorized beach restoration and nourishment, pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 161.101 (2012). Under the 
statute each level of local government typically contributes roughly a third of the cost. This funding has 
gone to restore and maintain almost 56% of the state’s critically eroded beaches. Beach Management 
Funding Assistance (BMFA) Program, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://floridadep.gov/wra/beaches-
funding (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). However, as the recent experience with Hurricane Matthew 
illustrated, these efforts can be quickly washed away by a single major storm, leading to increasing calls 
to reevaluate the commitment to this strategy. See Robert S. Young, The Beach Boondoggle, Opinion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/opinion/the-beach-
boondoggle.html?_r=0 (detailing the costs of beach renourishment and urging prioritization of federal 
funding to create appropriate incentives that better align with the broader interest of all taxpayers). 
 31. Thomas K. Ruppert, Eroding Long-Term Prospects for Florida’s Beaches: Florida’s 
Coastal Construction Control Line Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 65, 67–68 (2008). 
 32. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1109–14 
(Fla. 2008) (explaining the relationship between public and upland owners under common law 
principles and Florida’s statutes). 
 33. See, e.g., Beach Access, supra note 1 (describing the public’s lack of knowledge regarding 
actions that restrict beach access). 
 34. See id. (highlighting the public’s confusion over the precise location of property 
boundaries); see also Deborah Wheeler, Update: Walton Commissioners Vote to Remove Signs, Ropes 
from Beach, WALTON SUN (Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Walton Update], 
http://www.nwfdailynews.com/news/20160615/update-walton-commissioners-vote-to-remove-signs-rop 
es-from-beach (describing the public’s anger over the municipality regulating public spaces that were 
believed to be private property). 
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these rules is a complex, uncertain, and data-intensive inquiry in many 
settings.35 
Even courts resolving disputes over public and private rights in the 
contested coastal zone have sometimes been far from rigorous in their 
analyses, resolving disputes with simplistic conclusions about causation,36 
and paying insufficient attention to legally important geographic features in 
the area.37 As the battle lines are drawn more frequently, far more technical 
discussions about the mean high-water line, the foreshore between mean 
low- and high-water lines, and the area between the mean high-water line 
and the vegetation line have become essential.38 
A. Sovereign Submerged Lands and the Public Trust 
Florida common law, like the law of many states, recognizes three 
zones along the coast that have distinct characteristics under real property 
law: submerged lands, foreshore, and dry sand beach.39 An important, albeit 
dynamic, boundary demarcation in this zone is the mean high-water line 
(MHWL), a line determined based on the previous 19 years of mean high-
                                                                                                                 
 35. Given the arcane nature of the common law, such knowledge is not likely to be widely 
held. See infra pp. 11–14 (discussing determination of littoral property boundaries under Florida 
common law). 
 36. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106, aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 703 (2010) (affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s decision). 
The Florida Supreme Court states that under Florida law, hurricanes are “generally considered avulsive 
events.” Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1116. This seems an intuitively reasonable generalization. 
However, the very cases the court cites for this proposition reflect the frequent factual complexity of the 
impacts of hurricanes, not to mention the interaction of these impacts with subsequent erosion or 
accretion in the same areas. See, e.g., Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 
(involving an argument that the property was cut through by a hurricane, but was subsequently covered 
by an accretion to the plaintiff’s property). 
 37. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 79–80 (Fla. 1974) 
(Boyd, J., dissenting) (referring generically to “beaches” as though the term were self-defining). The 
division in the court in that case highlights the lack of clarity on how broad an area the courts should 
consider in determining both whether customary rights attach and whether a given activity interferes 
with them. 
 38. See generally Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 13, at 377 (stating that one of 
first macro effects of climate change will be a transition in the vegetation line because of sea-level rise 
and reduced rainfall); see also Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 58 (stating that, in Texas and New 
Jersey, public trust governs all the way to the first line of vegetation); Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 47, 
50, 54–56 (providing examples of how and why physical markers that determine private and state 
property rights along the coast must be scrutinized carefully as effects of climate change become more 
prolific). 
 39. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 60 (summarizing state legal doctrines related to 
public trust and littoral rights). 
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water lines.40 The Florida constitution, state statutes, and common law 
establish that the state holds lands below the MHWL in trust for the 
public.41 These lands include two zones with distinct qualities and legal 
significance: sovereign submerged lands42 and the foreshore (or wet sand 
beach), which is the sandy area between the MHWL and the mean low-
water line.43 The third zone, the dry sand beach, is less well defined, but 
generally describes the area between the MHWL and the vegetation line.44 
Florida Statute § 164.54 defines the term “beach” generally as extending 
from the seaward boundary of the foreshore (i.e., the low water mark) to 
“the place where there is marked change in material or physiographic form, 
or to the line of permanent vegetation, usually the effective limit of storm 
 waves” (i.e., the vegetation line). 45 
In describing the roots of the state’s title to the submerged lands under 
navigable waters, the Florida Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that these 
lands are held by the state: 
[N]ot for purposes of disposition to individual ownerships, but 
such title was held in trust for all the people of the states 
respectively, for the uses afforded by the waters as allowed by 
the express or implied provisions of law, subject to the rights 
surrendered by the states under the federal Constitution.46 
Among the uses protected by the public trust in navigable waters, sovereign 
submerged lands, and the foreshore are navigation, fishing, bathing,47 and 
activities for commerce.48 The state has authority to regulate these uses and 
                                                                                                                 
 40. FLA. STAT. §§ 177.27(14), (15) (2016) (defining “mean high water” and “mean high-water 
line”). 
 41. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; FLA. STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974) (providing that the mean high-
water line along coastlines is the boundary between state and privately owned land); Walton County, 
998 So. 2d at 1109 (recognizing that the state holds land seaward of the MHWL in trust for the public); 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 707 (recognizing that in Florida, the state owns the 
foreshore and submerged lands beneath navigable waters in trust for the public). 
 42. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
 43. Id.; see White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939) (noting Florida law that recognizes 
area between the high- and low-water marks as beach); see also Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 226 
(Fla. 1919) (describing which lands and navigable waters are property of the state or of its people). 
 44. See Common Law & Statutes, FLA. SEAGRANT, https://www.flseagrant.org/wateraccess/co 
mmon-law-statutes/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (illustrating the location of the dry sand beach relative 
to the mean high tide). 
 45. FLA. STAT. § 161.54 (2011). 
 46. Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909). 
 47. White, 190 So. at 449. 
 48. See Brickell, 82 So. at 226 (listing navigation, fishing, and other useful purposes in addition 
to commerce). 
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a duty to do so under both the common law and the state constitution,49 
subject to Congress’s superseding authority to regulate commerce.50 
The MHWL thus defines the landward reach of shorelands and waters 
subject to the public trust. Florida’s courts have repeatedly emphasized the 
primacy of the government’s duty to use lands below the MHWL for proper 
public uses,51 consistent with the state’s duty under Article X, Section 11 of 
the state constitution.52 
B. Private Lands and Littoral Rights 
In general, the seaward boundary of property that extends to the ocean 
and other tidal waters, such as the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida, 
is the MHWL.53 Property that extends to the MHWL of a tidal water body 
is typically called “littoral” property to distinguish it from property on 
flowing water bodies such as rivers or navigable streams, which are 
designated by the more general term riparian property.54 Littoral and other 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1110 (Fla. 2008)  
(quoting FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a)) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its 
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air 
and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the conservation and protection of 
natural resources.”). 
 50. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109–10 (quoting Brickell, 82 So. at 221). 
 51. See, e.g., Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829, 830 (Fla. 1909) (describing scope of public 
trust in a case involving a navigable lake); Brickell, 82 So. at 226 (explaining that states have the right to 
uphold and maintain navigable waters). 
 52. This section provides: 
The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, 
which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is 
held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of 
such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private 
use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not 
contrary to the public interest.  
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
 53. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 48–49 (recognizing that under Florida law, the location of 
the mean high-water line determines private and state property rights along the coast); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974) (stating that the mean high-water line is the seaward property boundary). 
 54. The term littoral property is also used to describe property bounding navigable lakes. In 
general, the common law doctrines applied to littoral property are the same as those that apply to 
riparian property that bounds a navigable stream, river or other flowing water. See, e.g., 4 HERBERT 
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1219 (3d ed. 2016) (using littoral and riparian 
rights interchangeably in describing the doctrine of accretion). Many of the basic principles related to 
boundaries and riparian rights were adopted in cases involving a riparian context. Id. The term “riparian 
rights” is typically used to describe the special rights accorded both littoral and riparian property 
owners. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 
934, 936 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing that “[c]ases and statutes, however, have used ‘riparian owner’ 
broadly to describe all waterfront owners”). 
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riparian landowners have special riparian rights in addition to sharing with 
the public the right to fishing, bathing, navigation, and commerce.55 In 
Florida, these include the right of access to and from the water, the right to 
retain an unobstructed view of the water, the right to use the water, and the 
right to protect the abutting property from trespass.56 In addition, littoral 
landowners have what the Florida Supreme Court has recently 
characterized as “contingent, future” rights under Florida common law: the 
right to acquire title to land exposed or created as a result of the operation 
of the common law doctrine of accretion.57 The Florida Supreme Court 
early on described the exclusive rights of a riparian owner as “such as are 
necessary for the use and enjoyment of his abutting property and the 
business lawfully conducted thereon; and these rights may not be so 
exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights.”58 
C. The Dynamic Boundary and Its Legal Significance 
Because the three zones noted above—submerged lands, the foreshore, 
and the dry sand beach—are defined with reference to the ebb and flow of 
the tides, their boundaries, and indeed their very location, can change as the 
level of the tides change.59 The MHWL is calculated over a period of 19 
                                                                                                                 
  Although many of the same principles are applied similarly in the riparian and littoral 
context, there are some points of divergence. See TIFFANY, supra §§ 1227–1229.1 (discussing separate 
principles for lakebeds, islands, and seashores). Courts may consider the littoral context significant for a 
variety of reasons. Moreover, the littoral context raises unique issues and challenges, including issues 
related to beach restoration and nourishment, and specialized statutory provisions that govern coastal 
areas. E.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105–07 (Fla. 
2008) (involving a constitutional challenge aiming to stop Walton County from proceeding with a 
beach-renoursishment project undertaken pursuant to a Florida statute). Because this paper focuses on 
sea-level rise, it will primarily discuss littoral property and the law related to littoral lands without 
noting the exceptions, where these rules may differ from those applicable in other riparian contexts. 
 55. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1111. 
 56. Id.; Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ 
Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 644–45 (Fla. 1909). The right to an unobstructed view of the water is not as common 
in other states as are the other riparian rights. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ET. AL., WATER LAW 37 (2017) 
(stating that only a small number of states, which includes Florida, recognizes a riparian right to an 
unobstructed view). 
 57. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1112 (noting that the right to acquire title to land 
exposed or created by the doctrine of accretion is different from other riparian rights because it is a 
contingent future right, not an easement).  
 58. Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. at 644–45. 
 59. See Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean 
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 186, 195, 197 (1974) (explaining that 
coastal boundaries are defined by the average rise and fall of the tide, and that tidal characteristics vary 
from place to place). 
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years,60 which reduces but does not eliminate the instability and uncertainty 
associated with what is a fundamentally dynamic boundary.61 Although the 
mean averages out the changes in the tides, the boundary can still fluctuate 
as much as the vagaries of the oceans and the common law legal framework 
dictate.62 
Several different processes can occur to change the relative location of 
the dry sand beach, the foreshore, and submerged lands, all of which have 
potential impact on the extent of the lands subject to the public trust and 
private ownership, respectively.63 First, the sea can deposit sand or other 
alluvium on areas that were previously part of the submerged lands or 
foreshore, both held in public trust.64 This may create dry land below the 
old MHWL in areas that were previously submerged lands or foreshore.65 
Over time, such a change may cause the MHWL to move seaward. Second, 
the sea can recede, leaving areas of the submerged lands or foreshore dry.66 
As with the deposit of alluvium, this can transform water into land and will 
eventually cause the MHWL to move seaward.67 Third, the sea can erode or 
submerge land, transforming areas that were previously above the MHWL 
(and therefore considered dry land) into foreshore or submerged lands.68 It 
can also transform the foreshore into submerged lands. This does not have 
significant implications for ownership or public rights, since the state holds 
both in trust for the public.69 Each of these processes can occur naturally, or 
as a direct or indirect result of human actions, such as filling, draining, or 
building structures like groins, jetties, or sea walls.70 
                                                                                                                 
 60. FLA. STAT. § 177.27(14) (1998); Tidal Datums, NOAA TIDES & CURRENTS, 
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html (last updated Oct. 15, 2013). 
 61. See Maloney, supra note 59, at 196 (explaining that determining boundaries like the 
MHWL follows the moon’s 18.6 year nodal cycle, ultimately reducing the amount of variation). 
 62. See FLA. STAT. § 177.28(2) (1974) (stating that the legal significance of the MHWL as the 
boundary between sovereign submerged lands and adjacent private lands “shall [not] be deemed to 
modify the common law of this state with respect to the legal effects of accretion, reliction, erosion, or 
avulsion”). 
 63. See Lear, supra note 2, at 266–70 (explaining five situations where dynamic shoreline 
boundaries were litigated). 
 64. Id. at 276. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 642. 
 67. Id. 
 68. As one court aptly noted, submersion and erosion are the reverse of the processes that 
deposit alluvium, and if slow and imperceptible, they are subject to application of the same legal 
principle. Mun. Liquidators v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
 69. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 352 (explaining that when land is submerged, public 
ownership moves landward to the new water’s edge); see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (providing that 
submerged lands belong to the state). 
 70. Perhaps because up until the present, there has been only modest increase in sea level, case 
law and commentary do not generally reference submersion of dry land without erosion. Any such 
2017] Beach Law Cleanup 103 
 
In Florida, as in many jurisdictions, the law permits the seaward 
boundary of littoral property to change in circumstances when the line 
between water and dry land moves.71 Florida, like many jurisdictions, 
distinguishes between gradual and imperceptible changes to this boundary 
on the one hand and sudden and dramatic changes on the other.72 Gradual 
changes are termed accretion, reliction (known also by the more archaic 
term dereliction), or erosion, depending on which of the three processes 
described above is involved.73 Sudden changes in either direction are 
generally described as resulting from avulsive events.74 The term 
“avulsion” is used generically to indicate a dramatic shift in the location of 
water, whether the avulsive event causes a submersion of dry property, a 
deposit of alluvium that transforms submerged land or the foreshore to dry 
land, or a rapid withdrawal of water.75 Under the applicable legal doctrine, 
very different consequences result from gradual and imperceptible changes 
following accretion, reliction, and erosion than from similar changes 
following an avulsive event.76 
Florida is perhaps fortunate to have the clarity of a recent decision by 
the state Supreme Court, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
included a review of the state’s basic property law as it relates to the 
dynamic shoreline.77 In Walton County v. Stop Beach the Renourishment, 
                                                                                                                 
change over time will likely cause erosion, as well. This paper will use the term erosion to encompass 
submersion, as well. However, were the submersion of dry land to be solely the result of a dramatic and 
sudden event, it might be best described as flooding or submersion. Such events would likely be covered 
by the doctrine of avulsion rather than accretion/erosion. 
 71. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 
2008) (stating that the legal effect of changes in the boundaries of shorelines depends on the speed of the 
change); see also Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
1957, 1968–69 (2013) (stating that loss of land under the doctrine of avulsion does not change the pre-
existing mean high-water line). 
 72. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (Fla. 2008) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal 
Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla.1987)) (explaining the 
difference between gradual and sudden changes); TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1219; see also Peloso & 
Caldwell, supra note 19, at 114 (noting specific rights of littoral owners in Florida). 
 73. Lear, supra note 2, at 265. In order to distinguish various scenarios, this article will use the 
terms accretion, reliction, and erosion to describe relevant physical processes. The article will also 
frequently use the term accretion to describe the legal doctrine that applies in cases of gradual erosion 
and reliction. Therefore, although this paper will focus primarily on the doctrine of erosion, it will 
sometimes refer to the doctrine of accretion/erosion, although doctrinal discussions often refer only to 
accretion and avulsion, and ignore erosion. This paper will generally omit reference to reliction because 
reliction is infrequently implicated in an era of sea-level rise. 
 74. Wyman & Williams, supra note 71, at 1970. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311. 
 77. See generally Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1105 (rejecting challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, a Florida statute under which restoration and 
re-nourishment of almost half of the state’s beaches is ongoing). 
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Inc., the Florida Supreme Court reviewed and reiterated the meaning of 
these important common law doctrines.78 It summarized the legal 
consequences for the littoral property boundary of these different 
processes.79 
Accordingly, under the doctrines of erosion, reliction, and 
accretion, the boundary between public and private land is altered 
to reflect gradual and imperceptible losses or additions to the 
shoreline. In contrast, under the doctrine of avulsion, the 
boundary between public and private land remains the MHWL as 
it existed before the avulsive event led to sudden and perceptible 
losses or additions to the shoreline.80 
The doctrines of accretion and erosion developed as an exception to the 
common law property rule requiring a deed transferring title in order to 
change a property boundary.81 Under Florida law, changes are presumed to 
be caused by gradual accretion, erosion, or submersion absent proof of an 
avulsive event.82 Thus, the accretion doctrine, pursuant to which the 
boundary moves with the gradually shifting sands, represents the default 
rule.83 When rising seas or erosion change the MHWL, property boundaries 
are subject to change as well, unless evidence is offered to sustain the 
conclusion that the change was caused by an avulsive event.84 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. at 1109–14. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1114 (internal citation omitted). 
 81. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311–12 (explaining that in the 1600s, transfer of 
accreted from sovereign to subject was exceptional and justified by the fact that the change was so 
minimal as to be insignificant). 
 82. In Municipal Liquidators v. Tench, a district court of appeals in Florida stated that: 
[T]here is a presumption of accretion or erosion as against avulsion. As stated in 
Gubser v. Town, the law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
that changes to riparian land occur “by accretion, and not by a sudden and violent 
force.” Further, “[t]he person who claims the land under the water has the burden 
of showing that it caved off suddenly.”  
Mun. Liquidators, Inc., v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (The 
Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co. (1904), reprinted in 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS 331–332 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2006)). Professor Sax points out some notable 
cases in which courts have strained to find accretion where it is hard to conclude that the change was 
imperceptible as it occurred. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351–53. However, as the stakes increase 
for landowners with sea-level rise, landowners’ challenges will likely put some pressure on courts that 
have applied an almost irrefutable presumption of accretion in the past. 
 83. See, e.g., Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23, 34–36 (1904) (finding that the doctrine of 
accretion governs absent proof of avulsion). 
 84. See Mun. Liquidators, 153 So. 2d at 731 (holding that the party claiming the benefit from 
avulsion has the burden of proving avulsion occurred). 
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even when a court finds that an avulsive event caused the change, the 
doctrine only accords the landowner the “right to reclaim” the land “within 
a reasonable time.”85 Although rarely elaborated, this limitation seems best 
explained by the fact that: (1) submerged lands are presumed to be of 
limited value to landowners; and (2) submerged lands serve important 
public interests under the public trust that will ultimately prevail unless the 
landowner asserts the right to reclaim.86 
In the language quoted above, the Florida Supreme Court summarized 
the legal doctrines by identifying the diagnostic fact that distinguishes the 
setting in which the two doctrines apply: the speed of the change.87 
However, it is important to note that a change and the speed of the change 
do not resolve the legal question.88 A careful review of case law reveals that 
proper application of these principles requires consideration of a number of 
additional factors. As Joseph Sax notes in his excellent history of the 
doctrines, the mere fact of a natural change did not automatically produce a 
change in title.89 The boundary changes only if a court, after considering 
relevant factors or justifications, determines that the accretion doctrine 
should apply.90 In its opinion in Walton County, the Florida Supreme Court 
explicitly adopted this approach as well.91 Thus, the rationales or 
justifications for applying the ambulatory boundaries framework play an 
important role in the doctrines’ application. Likewise, the facts relevant to 
these rationales have doctrinal significance. The next section examines 
these rationales in detail below. 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 
(Fla. 2008) (stating that the doctrine of avulsion recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land 
within a reasonable time”); see also Trs. of Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of Southampton v. 
Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that the property owner had the right to 
reclaim land that had become suddenly submerged, but not the portion lost through erosion). 
 86. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (conditioning the ability to reclaim on reasonable 
time and citing earlier case allowing self-help in doing so); Mun. Liquidators, 153 So. 2d at 731 
(holding that the party claiming the benefit from avulsion has the burden of proving avulsion occurred). 
 87. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117. 
 88. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 324 (requiring that claimants to accreted land show 
legal justification for a change in title). 
 89. Id. at 324–25. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118–19 (finding that none of the four rationales for 
according a right to accretion applied in the context of the case). 
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D. The Rationales Supporting the Doctrines of Accretion/Erosion and 
Avulsion 
Joseph Sax’s analysis of the historical roots of the common law 
doctrines illustrates the change over time in values used to justify the 
contours of these common law doctrines.92 Sax’s analysis also shows the 
doctrines’ lack of coherence with the rationales that historically justified 
their use.93 Notwithstanding these apt critiques, certain justifications for 
applying the doctrines have endured throughout most of their history. These 
rationales are: (1) the minimal impact of boundary changes to property 
interests (the de minimis rationale); (2) reciprocity or fairness; 
(3) protection of the sovereign’s (or public) interest; and (4) social utility or 
productive use of land.94 These four rationales appear fairly consistently in 
the earliest British cases. However, a fifth rationale or justification has 
become central and arguably dominant in American common law: 
protection of the littoral landowner’s right of access to the water. 95 
In its decision in Walton County, the Florida Supreme Court 
considered all five key rationales to justify its decision.96 In deciding that 
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act did not deprive littoral owners of the 
riparian right to receive future accretions, the Court concluded that none of 
the rationales for allowing accretions to benefit a littoral property owner 
supported  applying  the  doctrine  to  the  plaintiff’s  context. 97 The  Court 
surveyed four core rationales for allowing the accretion doctrine to change 
property boundaries: de minimis non curat lex; reciprocity; productive use 
of land; and preservation of the riparian right of access to water.98 It also 
noted that the right to accretion arises from “a rule of convenience intended 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See generally, Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 334–42 (exploring the evolution over time 
of the rationales offered, including rationales that have been abandoned, such as the “lost boundary” 
rationale, and newer rationales, such as maintaining water access). The analysis here distills the 
common components of the rationales that endure to the present. 
 93. Id. at 337 (describing how, in the 19th century, English jurisprudence retained the 
accretion/avulsion doctrine when all the rationales that had supported the doctrines had been abandoned 
or rejected). 
 94. Id. at 330. 
 95. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as 
primary rationale in modern United States cases); POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (citing 
numerous cases and describing water access as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for 
accretion). 
 96. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118–19.  
 97. Id. at 1114–15, 1118 (discussing de minimis, reciprocity, and productive use of land and 
water access, and describing the legal framework as balancing public and private interests). 
 98. Id. at 1114 (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach 
Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 212–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). 
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to balance public and private interests . . . .”99 It identified the rationale for 
applying the avulsion doctrine as the need to mitigate the hardship of 
drastic shifts in title resulting from sudden and unexpected changes in the 
shoreline.100 On the facts before it, the Court concluded that “[n]one of [the] 
doctrinal reasons [for applying the rule of accretion] apply here.”101 
The relationship between these rationales and the slow/fast distinction 
that determines which rule applies is subtle and not always obvious. Some 
of the rationales seem equally applicable whether the change is slow or fast. 
In other words, they do not always justify the preference for applying one 
rule over the other. Most of the time, they justify having a distinct rule in 
the coastal boundaries context instead of applying background common law 
property rules that generally govern boundaries. Some of the rationales 
support both rules for different reasons. This part briefly describes each of 
the five rationales, both as each appears in the early British cases and in 
recent United States case law. Part II then explores the connection between 
these rationales and the changed factual reality presented in the context of 
sea-level rise. 
1. De Minimis Non Curat Lex 
Sax’s history illustrates that the earliest cases applying the ambulatory 
boundaries framework relied on the fact that the volume of acreage 
involved was too small to concern the sovereign as a rationale for applying 
the special legal framework.102 This rationale justified depriving the 
sovereign of lands in cases of accretion.103 Given that the acreage involved 
in some of the early cases offering this rationale is arguably substantial,104 
Sax suggests that perhaps the de minimis concept is contextual and best 
understood as referring not to the acreage assessed in the abstract, but to the 
impact on the sovereign’s overall interest in controlling the coast and 
submerged lands.105 In that light, even hundreds of acres might be 
considered to be of little significance to the king’s interest, which largely 
lay in preserving public access to navigation and protecting strategic 
military interests in the coast during that era.106 Another possible reading is 
that the sum of the lands likely to be affected by applying the doctrines was 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 1118. 
 100. Id. at 1114. 
 101. Id. at 1118. 
 102. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312, 324 (referring to de minimis non curat lex). 
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at 331 (discussing a case that involved property measuring 453 acres). 
 105. Id. at 329. 
 106. Id. at 325. 
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de minimis because cases of significant accretion and erosion were rare.107 
Modern cases continue to offer de minimis impacts as a rationale justifying 
application of the ambulatory boundaries framework.108 
2. Fairness 
From the earliest British cases through to the modern era, fairness has 
appeared as a core value to which courts have looked to justify accretion 
and avulsion.109 In cases of accretion, courts justify awarding newly 
exposed or created land to riparian landowners on a theory of “reciprocity” 
that is grounded in fairness.110 Riparian landowners deserve to benefit from 
the gains of a receding sea, as the argument goes, because they bear the 
special costs and risks of inundation, as well.111 Fairness also appears, albeit 
in a slightly different form, as a justification for the avulsion doctrine.112 
The relative hardship produced by a dramatic shift in title resulting from a 
sudden event is a theme in both older and modern cases.113 Allowing the 
boundary to remain unchanged permits the landowner to reclaim the land if 
reclamation is feasible and can be accomplished within a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id.  
 108. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118 
(“[C]ritically eroded shorelines can hardly be characterized as trifles with which the law does not 
concern itself.”); TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1219 n.4 (citing State Eng’r of Nev. v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 
478 P.2d 159, 162 (Nev. 1970)) (involving reliction). But see POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01 n.24 
(stating that justification has received little modern support.). 
 109. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 325, 342. 
 110. Id. at 308, 320. 
 111. Id. at 320, 321–22 (discussing the Abbot of Ramsey’s case and Callis on Sewers, 
respectively). In the Abbot of Ramsey’s case, the reciprocity is expressed in terms of the landowner’s 
marsh, which “sometimes shrinks, through the influx of the sea, and at other times is enlarged by the 
flowing out of the sea . . . .” Id.at 318. See also id. at 340 n. 199, 341 (discussing the 19th Century 
American treatise writer Roger Angell’s incorporation of the reciprocity rationale to support the doctrine 
of accretion, and identifying Hall’s adoption of Blackstone’s three rationales for accretion, one of which 
was reciprocity). More modern cases include Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 329 (1973) 
(describing a “compensation theory” that justifies awarding riparian landowner accretions); Banks v. 
Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 67 (1864) (providing two different reasons coastal property owners should benefit 
from a receding sea); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 57 (1874) (holding that a riparian 
owner has a fair right to avulsion); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2009) (summarizing compensation or equity theory). 
 112. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 336. 
 113. See id. at 324–25 (suggesting that the gradualness of the process of change may diminish 
the sense of loss); Bonelli Cattle, 414 U.S. at 327 (stating that the rationale for avulsion is to mitigate the 
hardship that a shift in title resulting from a sudden shift in a river would cause); Walton County, 998 
So. 2d at 1113–14; see also POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n. 42 (citing Cox v. F-S Prestress, Inc., 
797 So. 2d 839, 843–44 (Miss. 2001)). 
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time.114 Given fairness’s use as a justification for both a static and a moving 
boundary, this rationale does not provide a coherent justification for 
treating sudden events differently from slow and imperceptible ones. 
However, it can perhaps be understood as justifying the deviation from the 
traditional principles governing real property boundary law. 
3. Protection of the Sovereign/Public Interest 
Britain implicitly recognized protection of the sovereign’s interest as 
an important consideration fairly early, although in some cases it was 
honored in the breach.115 Sax notes that by the 1600’s, commentators in 
England recognized the importance of the sovereign’s interest in land at the 
water’s edge.116 In several cases recounted by Callis, courts refused to 
allow the landowner to claim title to new land in cases of extensive reliction 
because of the impact on the sovereign.117 Lord Hale, and later British 
commentators and decisions, regarded the avulsion doctrine as aligned with 
the sovereign’s strategic interests in the shoreline because the avulsion 
doctrine left the boundary in place when sudden and substantial changes 
occured.118 Callis and Blackstone acknowledged this interest even when 
finding it unaffected in some cases where the de minimis nature of the 
sovereign’s loss justified applying the accretion doctrine.119 A few later 
cases emphasize the sovereign or public interest,120 but modern U.S. courts 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (stating that the doctrine of avulsion 
recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land within a reasonable time”); see also Trs. of 
Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of Southampton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975) (holding that the property owner had the right to reclaim the land that had become suddenly 
submerged, but not the portion lost through erosion). 
 115. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312, 324. 
 116. Id. at 312 n.29. 
 117. Id. at 322 (describing the cases of Brown and Bushey). This was recast by Hall in his 1853 
essay to emphasize the de minimis amount of land. In Hall’s view, imperceptibility of the change 
provided a proxy for evidence of lack of value and hence a conclusion of negligible impact on the 
sovereign. Id.  
 118. Id. at 325, 327. This leaves unaddressed the risk of slow but substantial change, which 
could adversely affect the sovereign’s interest, but presumably not in such a dramatic fashion, hence 
providing the sovereign time to adapt or respond to the changing situation. See id. at 332 n.149 
(discussing the House’s of Lords explicit consideration of the lack of harm to the sovereign’s interest in 
Lord Yarborough’s case, awarding 453 acres formed by accretion to the littoral landowner, and 
distinguishing cases in which large areas of sovereign lands are exposed suddenly); id. at 342 
(discussing three rationales for the rule of accretion in Hall’s Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the 
Privileges of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm). 
 119. Id. at 312, 324. 
 120. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 328 (1973) (finding the rationale for avulsion 
not applicable because the river was too wide and shallow to permit navigation, thereby limiting the 
state’s interest in the property). In Corpus Christi v. Davis, a Texas appellate court declined to 
determine the question of the applicability of the doctrine of avulsion to tidelands because of its 
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often focus on the public trust doctrine and the sovereign’s duties as trustee 
of submerged lands as the legal grounding for considering the protection of 
the public interest in these cases.121 
4. Social Utility 
The theme of social utility similarly appears in several different guises 
throughout these doctrines’ evolution. At its heart, this rationale focuses on 
productive use of land.122 It is often expressed in the notion that land ought 
to have an owner.123 This is a somewhat puzzling assertion, because the 
question in all these cases is not whether the land will be unowned, but 
rather who will be the owner.124 Nonetheless, the underlying value asserted 
seems to be the social good of productive use of land by private 
landowners. This rationale appears in both early125 and recent126 cases. 
A related notion that early commentators identified, but which fell out 
of favor, was that customary use, or something akin to prescription, 
justified the accretion doctrine.127 This Lockean notion of rewarding land 
                                                                                                                 
potential impact on the public interest. See Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App. 
1981) (“Application of the rule of avulsion to tidal lands would permit private ownership of land under 
the sea, would restrict the enjoyment of public beaches, would jeopardize the right of the public to 
navigate upon and to fish in the State’s waters, and would render the location of seaward boundaries an 
exercise of pure guesswork.”); see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 
2d 1102, 1113–14 (Fla. 2008) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 261–62 (1743)) (describing common law doctrines as reflecting an attempt to balance public 
and private interests). 
 121. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109, 1114–15 (discussing the balancing between 
public and private interests). 
 122. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] nn.30 & 32. Powell also notes the flip side—the 
inefficiency of small isolated tracts of land surrounded by water. Id.; see also Aronow v. State, No. A12-
0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (discussing the state’s duty to put public 
land to productive use). See generally Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., 196 S.W.3d 5, 7, 11 (Ark. 2004) 
(examining the transfer of mineral rights and royalties of an unsevered mineral interest due to riverbank 
accretion). 
 123. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118 (finding it is within the community’s interest 
to ensure all land is owned). 
 124. See id. at 1105 (posing the issue of whether residents’ land was taken, which required a 
determination of original ownership). 
 125. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 333 & n.150 (discussing Lord Yarborough’s case in 
which the House of Lords noted “occupation and improvement” as grounds for accretion, and stated that 
slowly accreted lands adjacent to a littoral landowner are of almost immediate use and value to the 
landowner, but “of no use to the King”). See generally Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 69 (1864) 
(expanding on the concept that land should not be left unowned). 
 126. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (expanding on the public policy consideration 
that all lands should have an owner); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2009) (expanding on the public policy consideration that all lands should have an owner). 
 127. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 319 (summarizing Hale’s description of the Abbot of 
Peterborough’s case). 
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users has both fairness and utilitarian strains.128 This theme of rewarding 
use also appears in a form akin to archaic, almost mystical notions of 
property—that the land “becomes part and parcel of the upland estate” by 
virtue of the adjacent landowner’s use.129 
5. Protection of Littoral Landowners’ Right of Access to Water 
As Professor Sax points out, protection of the riparian right of access to 
water was not among the values explicitly considered in the early 
development of accretion and avulsion doctrines in Britain.130 However, it 
has become of primary importance in the United States,131 becoming 
arguably the single strongest rationale for both doctrines.132 
II. ERODING FOUNDATIONS: HOW SEA-LEVEL RISE UNDERMINES THE 
AMBULATORY BOUNDARIES FRAMEWORK 
The dynamic environment along our coasts today fundamentally differs 
from the environment assumed to exist at the water’s edge when these 
doctrines were developing. Part II.A catalogs the ways in which sea-level 
rise creates a context that is distinct, in arguably relevant ways, from the 
context in which the ambulatory boundaries framework developed and has 
been applied until recently. It describes four key factual assumptions made 
in the cases from which the doctrine developed and in which they have 
recently been applied. These assumptions recognize that the environment is 
dynamic to some extent, but assume that the system operates within defined 
boundaries based on experience.133 It then describes how sea-level rise 
changes the factual context, such that these four assumptions are no longer 
true. 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 333–34. 
 129. Id. at 330 (examining the rationale for the rule’s method of disposing of land). 
 130. Id. at 347. 
 131. Id. at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as the primary rationale in modern 
U.S. cases); see Bonelli Cattle v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (recognizing that the riparian 
quality of the land may be the land’s most valuable feature). See generally TIFFANY, supra note 54, 
§ 1219 (stating that the rules are designed to protect a littoral or riparian owner’s right of access to the 
water). 
 132. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (citing numerous cases and describing water access 
as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for accretion); see also State of Oregon v. Sause, 
342 P.2d 803, 825 (Or. 1959) (quoting Hanson v. Thornton, 179 P. 494, 496 (Or. 1919) (“When we 
speak of riparian rights, we are not considering a mere shadowy privilege, but a substantial property 
right, the right of access to and a usufruct in the water.”). 
 133. Professor Ruhl describes similar assumptions made by ecologists under the dynamic 
equilibrium model as exhibiting the flawed assumption of stationarity—fluctuation within an 
unchanging envelope of variability. Ruhl, Structural Transformation, supra note 13, at 1393–94. 
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First, unlike the changes in littoral boundaries experienced historically, 
which were random and unpredictable, sea-level rise is predictable.134 
Second, courts premised the ambulatory boundaries framework on the 
assumption that the change experienced by littoral landowners is equally 
likely to be a gain or a loss; in contrast, sea-level rise is “unidirectional,”135 
as Joseph Sax aptly termed the change.136 Third, the changes experienced 
historically were episodic and geographically limited. Sea-level rise is 
ongoing and predicted to continue for hundreds of years, and it will have 
geographically pervasive effects and a broad social impact.137 Fourth, 
courts developed these doctrines to address all water bodies and assumed 
homogeneity of the processes of change affecting all water bodies.138 Sea-
level rise only affects properties that are near to the coast.139 Part II.B 
elaborates on each of these archaic factual assumptions and the changes 
resulting from sea-level rise. 
Part II.B then considers how these factual changes undermine the 
rationales that supported both the development and the current application 
of the ambulatory boundaries framework. It considers each of the five 
rationales for the ambulatory boundaries framework, evaluating how the 
changed facts affect the viability of these rationales. This raises the question 
of whether these doctrines, on their own terms, have continued application 
in the context of sea-level rise and, if so, how these changed facts should 
affect their application.140 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing common law’s failure to differentiate between different 
bodies of water). 
 139. Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr. et al., Hotspot of Accelerated Sea-Level Rise on the Atlantic Coast 
of North America, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 884, 884 (2012). 
 140. This analysis seems congruent with Professor Flatt’s recommendation in the statutory 
realm, that in deciding how to apply or adapt a legal regime, one should identify “stress points in a 
changed future, and how legal and policy alterations can address those stress points while preserving the 
original purposes of the regime and considering both distributive justice and efficiency.” Flatt, supra 
note 13, at 287. In this setting, the archaic factual assumptions are the stress points, and the rationales 
underlying ambulatory boundaries framework are analogous to a statutory regime’s “original purposes.”  
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A. Four Archaic Factual Assumptions 
1. Predictability 
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Unpredictable 
The notion that the change in water bodies’ profiles is random and 
unpredictable is almost part of the DNA of the ambulatory boundaries 
framework. Cases applying the ambulatory boundaries framework evince a 
fatalistic acceptance of the unpredictable vagaries of water bodies.141 
References to the changes in the coastline that precipitated litigation in 
early cases suggest that the occurrence, direction, extent, and timing of 
these changes were random and unpredictable events.142 This factual 
predicate supports the fairness rationale for the accretion and the avulsion 
doctrines.143 
b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is Neither Random nor Totally Unpredictable 
Sea-level rise is a documented and ongoing process.144 It is not 
random, and it is becoming increasingly predictable.145 It is the subject of 
extensive scientific study. Technology has enabled scientists to estimate 
confidently the direction and likelihood of change over the coming decades, 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (“Riparian land is at the 
mercy of the wanderings of the river.”); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012) 
(“Oceanfront beaches change every day. Over time and sometimes rather suddenly, they shrink or grow, 
and the tide and vegetation lines may also shift. Beachfront property lines retract or extend as previously 
dry lands become submerged or submerged lands become dry.”). 
 142. Cases involving avulsive events describe them as sudden and unusual. Severance, 370 
S.W.3d at 708 passim (describing the sudden and dramatic changes in beachfront areas); Wood v. 
McAlpine, 118 P. 1060, 1064 (Kan. 1911) (holding that for an event to constitute avulsion, “the 
change . . . must be . . . sudden, and unusual . . . .”). In cases involving accretion, courts emphasize the 
vagaries of changes that could make littoral owners either winners or losers. See supra Part I.D.2 
(discussing the fairness rationale behind the ambulatory boundaries framework). While accretion cases 
often emphasize the bidirectionality of change in particular, these statements also suggest a general lack 
of predictability. The gain that a large accretion represents is often justified by the risk of an equally 
large erosion. See, e.g., United States v. 11993.32 Acres of Land, 116 F. Supp. 671, 678 (D.N.D. 1953) 
(“A rule of law cannot control the vagaries of a river. Hence, the general rule rests upon the equitable 
idea that a riparian owner should have the opportunity to gain by accretion since he is subject to the 
hazard of loss by erosion.”). 
 143. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the fairness rationale behind the ambulatory boundaries 
framework). 
 144. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2–4 (Paulina Aldunce et al. eds., 2015), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf (noting observed 
changes in the climate system). 
 145. See id. at 10–16 (discussing past and present climate change observations and what future 
projections might be based on those observations). 
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despite uncertainty about the pace of that anticipated change.146 Although 
the precise timing and extent of changes anticipated along the coast is 
uncertain, the fact that scientists can confidently predict the direction and 
likelihood of change has important ramifications for the rationales that 
justify the erosion and avulsion doctrines.147 Today, hurricanes, storms, and 
the attendant damaging storm surges are reasonably foreseeable for any 
coastal landowner with a structure close to the shoreline.148 The courts that 
developed and applied these doctrines clearly did not envision a generally 
predictable process that would continue for at least several hundred years, 
thereby giving landowners and the sovereign notice and opportunity to plan 
ahead. 
2. Directionality 
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Equally Likely to Move 
the Boundary in Either Direction 
The common law doctrines also envision that landowners may be 
winners or losers due to the vagaries of the tides on any given day.149 The 
land they were using might become submerged and no longer usable, or the 
sea might expose new usable land. Historically, litigants and courts seemed 
                                                                                                                 
 146. E.g., DAVID ANTHOFF ET AL., Global and Regional Exposure to Large Rises in Sea-Level: 
A Sensitivity Analysis §§ 1, 2.1 (Tyndall Ctr. for Climate Change Research, Working Paper No. 96, 
2006) (noting that “even if the climate is stabili[z]ed, sea levels continue to rise for many centuries due 
to the long timescales of the oceans and the large ice sheets”); Anny Cazenave & William Llovel, 
Contemporary Sea Level Rise, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF MARINE SCIENCE 145 (2010) (stating that tide 
gauge measurements showing significant sea-level rise have been available since the 20th century); John 
A. Church & Neil J. White, Sea-Level Rise from the Late 19th to the Early 21st Century, 32 SURV. 
GEOPHYSICS 585, 585–86 (2011) (stating that sea levels will continue to rise even if emissions are 
curbed and the atmosphere stabilized); IPCC, supra note 144, at 10–16 (discussing past and present 
climate change observations and what future projections might be based on those observations); SEA 
LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT., UNIFIED SEA LEVEL RISE 
PROJECTION FOR SOUTHEAST FLORIDA 1, 4, 7–8 (2015), http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.or 
g/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-Compact-Unified-Sea-Level-Rise-Projection.pdf (projecting the 
anticipated range of sea-level rise for the Southeast Florida region from 1992–2100). 
 147. This is explored in detail infra Part II.B. 
 148. The national media frequently cover not only extreme events such as Superstorm Sandy, 
but also the damaging effects of storm surge and tides exacerbated by sea-level rise. E.g., Lizette 
Alvarez & Frances Robles, Intensified by Climate Change, “King Tides” Change Ways of Life in 
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/intensified-by-climate-
change-king-tides-change-ways-of-life-in-florida.html?emc=eta1&_r=0 (examining the phenomena of 
“sunny day” flooding due to rising sea levels); Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change Could Swamp 
Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/science/global-
warming-coastal-real-estate.html?emc=eta1 (reporting that homebuyers are becoming increasingly wary 
of purchasing homes along the coast). 
 149. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 320. 
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to assume that changes in the coast creating new land and submerging dry 
land were equally likely.150 This factual assumption of bidirectional change 
provides key support for the reciprocity rationale that, in turn, supports the 
accretion doctrine.151 The fact that one of the two directions in which 
change could occur exposed new dry land was also critical to both the 
social-utility rationale for accretion,152 and the rationale of protecting 
littoral landowners’ access to water.153 
b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise is Unidirectional 
The factual assumption that coastal landowners have roughly equal 
chances of loss and gain is no longer justified in an era of sea-level rise. 
The scientific predictions regarding change along America’s coast clarify 
that changes are no longer anticipated to occur with equal likelihood in both 
directions.154 Today, the dynamic along our coasts is (and will continue to 
be) predominantly erosion and inundation.155 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See id. at 318 (quoting description from Abbot of Ramsey’s case that “the marsh 
sometimes shrinks, through the influx of the sea, and at other times is enlarged by the flowing out of the 
sea . . . .”). Some cases involve a single geographic area that has recently experienced change in both 
directions. See, e.g., Siesta Properties v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 219, 222–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 
(involving accretions that formed on a location where a barrier island had previously eroded). 
 151. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973) (describing a “compensation 
theory” that justifies awarding riparian landowner accretions); Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 67 (1864) 
(providing two different reasons coastal property owners should benefit from a receding sea); County of 
St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 57 (1874) (reasoning that riparian property owners’ gains through 
avulsion are a reciprocal consideration for their more frequent losses); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 
v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 445 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (summarizing compensation or equity theory). 
 152. See Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 
2012) (discussing the state’s duty to put public land to productive use); Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., 
196 S.W.3d 5, 7, 11 (Ark. 2004) (examining the transfer of mineral rights and royalties of an unsevered 
mineral interest due to riverbank accretion); Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 
So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 2008) (finding it is within the community’s interest to ensure all land is owned); 
Banks, 69 U.S. at 69 (expanding on the concept that land should not be left unowned); Maunalua Bay 
Beach Ohana 28, 222 P.3d at 445 (expanding on the public policy consideration that all lands should 
have an owner). 
 153. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 347–49 (describing the emergence of water access as 
the primary rationale in modern United States cases); POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[3] n.36 (describing 
water access as “[t]he most persuasive and fundamental rationale” for accretion). 
 154. E.g., Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-Level Rise and Its Impacts on Coastal 
Zones, 328 SCIENCE 1517, 1518 (2010) (finding that the immediate effect of SLR is submergence and 
increased flooding on coastland); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 10–11 
(acknowledging the fact that an increase in loss of natural ecosystem services will cause coastal 
properties to lose more land to avulsion and erosion than have gains by accretion). 
 155. Of course, even in an era of sea-level rise, some coastal areas will experience accretion or 
reliction. However, the vast majority of littoral areas are facing inexorable and ongoing erosion or 
submersion. In addition, current erosion and attendant flooding on some areas of the coastline are more 
heavily influenced by inlet-management practices than by sea-level rise at present. Ruppert, supra note 
116 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:089 
This changed reality has profound implications for our law and policy. 
It fundamentally alters the nature of the social problem posed by the 
dynamic coastline. Framing coastal change as sometimes presenting 
opportunities for social gains—in other words, presenting the possibility of 
winning or losing property in the coastal dynamic and the battle for title—is 
directly linked to the assumption of bidirectionality. 
Because we are primarily a land-based species, there can only be 
meaningful social gains when the ocean recedes or land accretes, yielding 
more land for human endeavors.156 In contrast, submergence of land has 
almost always been experienced as a loss.157 Indeed, even a legal victory for 
a landowner whose land has been submerged awards that landowner 
nothing more than the right to reclaim the land from the ocean.158 In such 
cases, the changes to the coastline have not produced a social gain. On the 
contrary, the landowner has merely won the right to try to avoid a loss by 
undoing the social harm from the inundation. 
The change from a win-lose dynamic to a lose-lose dynamic is 
significant. Instead of needing a legal framework that can both allocate 
gains and losses, we may need a framework designed to deal with a 
situation that will largely entail allocating losses, not gains. 
                                                                                                                 
31, at 65, 67, 68. Over time, however, sea-level rise represents a far greater threat and will overtake the 
effects of other human activities. See THE FLA. OCEANS & COASTAL COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
SEA-LEVEL RISE IN FLORIDA 11 (2010) https://www.flseagrant.org/wp-content/uploads/Climate_Chang 
e_and_Sea_Level_Rise.pdf. Moreover, increasing awareness of sea-level rise’s impacts has motivated 
governments to improve inlet-management practices. In Florida, there is legislation requiring the 
Department of Environmental Protection to develop a statewide Beach Management Plan that includes 
inlet-management plans. FLA. STAT. § 161.161 (2010). Section 161.041(1)(b) requires that mitigation 
measures accompany authorization of inlet-management activities. Id. § 161.041(1)(b); see also Thomas 
P. Pierro, A Renewed Focus on Inlet Management: Committing to the Contributions of Dr. Dean and 
Senator Jones (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.fsbpa.com/15AnnualConfPresentations/Pierro.pdf 
(demonstrating the need for further developments in inlet management in Florida). 
 156. Allocating title to additional submerged land to the sovereign may protect the sovereign’s 
interest in owning the submerged lands all the way to the water’s edge, but the incremental increase in 
the actual stock of submerged lands rarely has any tangible benefits for the sovereign or the public. 
Exceptional situations could include areas with oyster beds or valuable harborage. However, in most 
situations, the submergence of lands does not improve the sovereign’s or public’s position in a 
meaningful way. In most cases, a legal ruling awarding title to the sovereign merely prevents a loss—
loss of control over the crucial area at the water’s edge. 
 157. Robert A. Morton, U.S. Geological Survey Ctr. for Coastal and Watershed Studies, 
Introduction: An Overview of Coastal Land Loss with Emphasis on the Southeastern United States, 
(2003), https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2003/of03-337/intro.html. 
 158. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1116, 1117 (Fla. 
2008) (explaining that landowners gain only the right to reclaim land lost to inundation up to the 
MHWL). 
2017] Beach Law Cleanup 117 
 
3. Frequency and Scope of Change 
a. The Assumption: Changes in Water Bodies Are Episodic, Occasional, 
and of Limited Geographic Scope 
The common law doctrines developed to resolve the exceptional cases 
along an otherwise stable coastline.159 In most areas, courts only use the 
doctrines to address occasional, episodic changes caused by events such as 
hurricanes,160 by human activity,161 or in areas that are particularly 
susceptible to change.162 Historically, these cases were not only episodic; 
they were limited in geographic scope.163 Early courts and commentators 
frequently justified their decisions through the de minimis impact of 
applying these doctrines.164 As Sax explains, courts considered the impact 
of cases on the King’s interest as de minimis even when the acreage 
involved was clearly significant.165 However, this characterization makes 
sense because the cumulative impact on the king’s interest was limited. 
This was true because the changes experienced along the coastlines were 
limited in geographic scope, and thus unlikely to affect the public 
interest.166 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312 (explaining that when the rule of accretion was 
applied to coastlines, transfer of title from sovereign to subject was considered exceptional). 
 160. See, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1970) (involving a controversy over a 
narrow strip of land that was a narrow strip of water before a hurricane struck); Siesta Properties v. Hart, 
122 So. 2d 218, 220, 223–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (examining the effects of accretion on Florida 
coastal property rights following a hurricane). 
 161. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 
934, 935 (Fla. 1987) (noting that a city-built jetty caused accretion). Inlet management and related 
human activities are a significant contributor to coastal erosion in many coastal areas, exacerbating the 
effects of sea-level rise, and in some areas dwarfing them. Ruppert, supra note 31, at 67–68. 
 162. See Robert E. Beck, The Wandering Missouri River: A Study in Accretion Law, 43 N.D. L. 
REV. 429, 436–37 (1967) (documenting several cases involving the Missouri River and its impact on 
riparian property rights); see also Siesta Properties, 122 So. 2d at 219, 220 (involving accretions that 
formed on a location where a barrier island had previously eroded). 
 163. Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 837; Siesta Properties, 122 So. 2d at 218, 219, 220.    
 164. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 
272 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (identifying de minimis non curat lex as one of the 
reasons for the accretion doctrine); Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 
1102, 1113 (Fla. 2008) (listing de minimis impact as one of the four reasons for the accretion doctrine). 
 165. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313. 
 166. Id. at 329. 
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b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is Ongoing and Geographically Pervasive 
Sea-level rise is an ongoing—not an episodic—phenomenon.167 
Although periodic storms may accelerate the pace and extent of change in a 
given geographic area,168 there is adequate scientific evidence to conclude 
that sea-level rise is an ongoing and inexorable process.169 Changes in the 
coastline are also no longer the exception; they are now the norm, even if 
scientists cannot precisely predict the pace of the change.170 At the very 
least, courts should consider whether rules designed to handle an 
occasional, exceptional occurrence should apply when the exception 
becomes the rule. 
Unlike the changes experienced in the past, sea-level rise is also 
geographically pervasive along our coasts.171 The anticipated changes along 
the nation’s coasts threaten to impair the public’s access to water and 
beaches. They also threaten ecosystem values throughout entire regions and 
states.172 Although sea-level rise will affect some areas less (because of 
topography or other factors), it is causing and will cause change along 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Rusk, supra note 4, at 298. 
 168. See, e.g., John Hunter, A Simple Technique for Estimating an Allowance for Uncertain Sea-
Level Rise, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 239, 240 (2011) (suggesting that present evidence links rising sea 
levels to extreme weather events); IPCC, supra note 144, at 8 (finding that increasing occurrences of 
extreme weather events implies greater risks on a regional scale); Claudia Tebaldi et al., Modelling Sea 
Level Rise Impacts on Storm Surges Along US Coast, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Jan.–March 2012, at 1, 1 
(comparing the local characteristics of margins of continental shelves). 
 169. See, e.g., ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 3.1, 4 (concluding that exposure of coastal areas to 
sea-level rise is significant and will likely grow substantially); Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at 
146, 165 (finding that melting ice sheets also greatly affect sea-level rise); Church & White, supra note 
146, at 585 (acknowledging that sea-level rise will impact coastal populations); IPCC, supra note 144, at 
2–4 (detailing scientific evidence in support of sea level rise); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 
146, at 8–9 (providing examples of large-scale natural events that are accelerating the rate of sea level-
rise and how those events are connected). 
 170. ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 2.1, 3.1 (finding that, while projections and models are 
limited, sea-level rise is nevertheless plausible given long-time scales and commitment to sea-level rise); 
Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at 149–50 (finding great regional variability in the rates of sea-level 
rise changes); Church & White, supra note 146, at 585–86 (explaining that global mean sea level is 
expected to continue rising despite uncertain projections); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518 
(highlighting the effect climate change has on coastal erosion). 
 171. See, e.g., Cazenave & Llovel, supra note 146, at 150 (describing rates of variability in sea-
level rise); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518 (highlighting the effect climate change has on 
coastal erosion); Sallenger, supra note 139, at 884 (asserting sea-level rise has been relatively low on the 
North American coast); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 9 (highlighting several 
locations along the East Coast that are affected specifically because of their proximity to the Gulf 
Stream). 
 172. See, e.g., SE. FLA. CLIMATE COMPACT CTYS., supra note 17, at 9 (examining the threat to 
coastal resources and ecosystems in Florida). 
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significant portions of the coastline in many states, including Florida.173 
This represents a different problem from the challenge of allocating risk in 
disputes that affect only a small number of coastal landowners and a limited 
stock of submerged lands held in public trust. 
4. Homogeneity of Water Bodies 
a. The Assumption: Changes in Oceans, Lakes, Rivers, and Streams All 
Share the Same Characteristics 
The ambulatory boundaries framework treats rivers, lakes, and oceans 
similarly, with only subtle distinctions in the principles applied to them.174 
To the extent that common law distinguishes among water bodies in 
applying accretion and avulsion, flowing rivers and streams constitute one 
category (riparian), while lakes and oceans constitute another (littoral).175 
The fundamental failure to recognize significant differences among these 
water bodies and the processes that change their contours may contribute to 
the incoherence in the ambulatory boundaries framework that 
commentators have frequently noted.176 It may also explain the lack of 
coherence in the rationales for the doctrine, given that the values at stake in 
a lake, riverine, or coastal setting can be quite different.177 Notably, for 
example, cases involving lakes and oceans rarely involve state boundaries, 
while some of the highest profile cases applying the doctrine involve rivers 
along state boundaries.178 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 30 (reporting 61% of Florida’s beaches were 
designated as eroding as of August 2016); Baptiste, supra note 15 (noting the different types of effects 
Florida has faced and will face in the future because of sea-level rise); see also Cazenave & Llovel, 
supra note 146, at 150 (showing the rising sea level on U.S. coasts). 
 174. See generally POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] n.11 (discussing traditional littoral and 
riparian values and the differential application of the doctrine of accretion); TIFFANY, supra note 54, 
§ 995 (treating “bank,” “shore,” “margin,” and “edge” similarly insofar as setting the mean high- and 
low-water mark). 
 175. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] 7.  
 176. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 321, 354 (providing different views that commentators 
have pieced together to form a coherent theory that meets their needs). For example, the explanation that 
is almost always used to explain the rationale for the rule governing avulsive events involves a river 
cutting through an oxbow or S-curve suddenly and unexpectedly. This scenario creates problems not 
presented in coastal settings. 
 177. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.01[2] n.11 (citing Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 S.2d 
495 (La. 1991)) (finding that riparian owners whose properties abut streams or rivers benefit from 
accretion, while riparian owners with properties abutting navigable waters, such as bays, do not). 
 178. See., e.g., Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23, 23, 24 (1904) (resolving a dispute about state 
boundaries along the Missouri River); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 370 (1892) (discussing rivers in 
relation to state boundaries). 
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b. The Reality: Sea-level Rise Is a Distinctively Coastal Process 
Sea-level rise challenges the idea that a single doctrine should address 
changes in all riparian settings, particularly in the traditional doctrinal 
pairing of coastal and lakefront properties. Sea-level rise will affect 
estuaries at the mouths of rivers and perhaps some lakes that drain into 
coastal waters.179 However, in general, it will affect only the boundaries of 
properties in close proximity to the coast.180 This new reality supports 
reconsidering the continued application of existing common law doctrines 
or, at the least, tailoring their application in contexts where sea-level rise 
will be a factor. 
The unified doctrine is not only unsuited to an era of sea-level rise; its 
development may also have been distorted by the different settings 
represented in case law. The vast majority of factual settings in cases 
applying avulsion are riverine.181 This raises the question of whether the 
doctrine makes sense in the coastal context. Moreover, several important 
riverine cases elaborating on the avulsion doctrine implicated state or other 
jurisdictional boundaries.182 This raises a number of considerations not 
implicated in cases involving the sudden submergence or erosion of coastal 
land. This article argues for careful consideration of whether the law of 
avulsion should apply in coastal settings generally, especially in light of the 
changes associated with sea-level rise. 
                                                                                                                 
 179. The Great Lakes and their connection to the Atlantic Ocean through the St. Lawrence River 
may provide an example. 
 180. E.g., ANTHOFF, supra note 146, §§ 3.1, 3.2.3 (finding that regions with “extensive[,] highly 
populated coastal lowlands” bear a disproportionate amount of damage from sea-level rise); Cazenave & 
Llovel, supra note 146, at 150 (showing that sea-level rise is more pervasive along the southern coasts 
of the United States); Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 154, at 1518 (finding that sea levels are rising 
faster in subsiding coasts); Sallenger, supra note 139, at 884 (finding that the northeast hotspot (NEH) 
of accelerated sea-level rise is unique across North American coasts between Key West, Florida and St. 
John’s, Newfoundland. Sea-level rate differences (SLRDs) in the NEH are three to four times larger 
than global SLRDs); SEA LEVEL RISE WORK GRP., supra note 146, at 9 (noting that coastal areas in 
particular have experienced an increase in flood frequency and will continue to do so at an accelerated 
rate).  
 181. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 311 n.24, 315, 351 nn.257 & 259 (referencing cases 
that involve avulsion in rivers). 
 182. See, e.g., Missouri, 196 U.S. at 35 (noting additional cases that have involved the problem 
of avulsion in determining state boundary lines); Nebraska, 143 U.S. at 370 (involving a boundary 
dispute between Nebraska and Iowa resulting from changes in the course of the Missouri River). 
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B. How Archaic Factual Assumptions Undermine the Rationales for the 
Ambulatory Boundaries Framework 
Part II.A illustrates that the four factual assumptions on which the 
ambulatory boundaries framework is grounded are no longer true. This 
section considers how the changed factual reality directly affects the 
viability of the rationales that courts have offered to justify applying the 
doctrine. It highlights how the changed reality resulting from sea-level rise 
undermines or transforms the five rationales for applying the ambulatory 
boundaries framework. 
1. De Minimis Non Curat Lex and Archaic Assumptions About 
Predictability, Frequency, and Scope of Change 
The fact that sea-level rise is predictable, ongoing, and geographically 
pervasive erodes the factual foundation for the de minimis rationale. 
Commentators closely identified the de minimis rationale with the doctrines 
of accretion and erosion, although cases applying the avulsion doctrine 
have cited to it as well.183 Thus, the de minimis rationale seems to justify 
having a special set of rules for boundaries at the water’s edge, rather than 
to justify applying the accretion or avulsion doctrines. 
As noted above,184 the facts of the cases in which judges first 
articulated the de minimis rationale suggest that the focus was not on 
whether the acreage involved in a particular case was minimal or 
substantial, but whether the overall effect on the sovereign’s interests was 
de minimis.185 The ongoing and geographically pervasive impacts of sea-
level rise and the substantial costs they will impose eliminate the factual 
foundation for considering the changes occurring along our coasts as de 
minimis.186 
Moreover, given that courts used the de minimis rationale to justify 
applying both the erosion and avulsion doctrines, the rationale cannot offer 
courts real guidance on how to resolve a case under the ambulatory 
boundaries framework. Thus, this rationale no longer seems relevant in the 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Some of the early commentators on avulsion referenced by Sax posited that avulsion might 
be distinguished by the larger scale of the change experienced. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 327 
(describing Hale’s standpoint). However the case law has ultimately not borne this out. 
 184. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the de minimis rationale). 
 185. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313. 
 186. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 988 So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 
2008) (concluding that critical erosion occurring on half of Florida’s beaches is hardly de minimis). To 
the extent that a court seeks to apply the framework, perhaps this rationale might come into play in 
special settings where the impact could be viewed as de minimis. 
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context of sea-level rise. The changed facts associated with sea-level rise 
undermine its utility and explanatory power. 
2. Fairness and Archaic Assumptions About Predictability, Directionality, 
Frequency, Scope of Change, and Homogeneity of Waterfront Contexts 
Courts using the fairness rationale to support the doctrine of accretion 
ground their decisions on the notion of reciprocity of risk—that coastal 
landowners risk both gains and losses in owning property close to the 
sea.187 Reciprocity justifies awarding coastal landowners land the sea 
exposed in order to offset the risk of loss from inundation.188 In cases of 
accretion, reciprocity of risk justifies awarding newly exposed land that 
belonged to the sovereign to coastal landowners.189 In addition, it similarly 
justifies awarding newly submerged land to the sovereign. This evokes a 
Rawlsian sort of fairness. Behind the veil of ignorance, courts operate under 
the premise that there is no information on who might gain or lose in the 
future.190 Because the assumptions of bidirectionality and unpredictability 
are no longer true, the notion of achieving fairness by allowing landowners 
to assume reciprocal risks is less convincing. 
In an era of sea-level rise, there will be relatively fewer instances of 
newly exposed land.191 Thus, the fairness rationale argues even more 
strongly for awarding newly exposed land to landowners to compensate for 
losses that will become more frequent. Indeed, in a context of sea-level rise, 
an ambulatory boundary will frequently cause the landowner to bear the 
risk of loss with little prospect of reciprocal gain. However, coastal 
landowners are not alone in bearing these new risks of loss.192 All taxpayers 
will be sharing much of the cost that sea-level rise imposes, including: 
subsidized federal flood insurance for coastal landowners and landowners 
in flood-prone areas; disaster preparation and response costs that protect 
and assist coastal landowners disproportionately; and increased costs of 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 308, 320–22. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 312.  
 190. See Giancarlo Panagia, Tot Capita Tot Sententiae: An Extension or Misapplication of 
Rawlsian Justice, 110 PENN ST. L.R. 283, 285–86 (2005) (explaining that when acting behind the veil of 
ignorance, individuals must act in the interest of all because they do not know which group they will 
represent). 
 191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (finding that the United States is likely to lose 
more of its coasts as the sea level rises). 
 192. Thomas Ruppert & Carly Grimm, Drowning in Place: Local Government Costs and 
Liabilities for Flooding Due to Sea-Level Rise, 87 FLA. BAR J. 9, 31–32 (2013) (explaining how non-
coastal landowners will still be affected by sea-level rise through mitigation efforts). 
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maintaining coastal areas before permanent inundation.193 These costs inure 
to the benefit of coastal landowners disproportionately.194 
The change in dynamic that sea-level rise creates—transforming a win-
lose equation to one that is largely lose-lose for all involved195—affects the 
extent to which any single principle will achieve fairness. Coastal 
landowners’ property interests will generally be adversely affected by an 
ambulatory boundary, while the public’s interest will suffer under a fixed 
boundary.196 Thus, courts should arguably rethink how best to achieve 
fairness in an era of sea-level rise and whether the notion of “reciprocity of 
risk” has any continuing relevance. 
The second way courts have invoked the fairness rationale 
distinguishes cases of rapid change from gradual change.197 Applying the 
avulsion doctrine to sudden change is often justified by expressed concern 
for the harsh surprises associated with sudden events, such as hurricanes.198 
The idea is that landowners experience sudden, perceptible loss as a greater 
loss than a gradual, imperceptible one. Therefore, landowners should be 
protected from sudden losses and given the opportunity to reclaim their 
lands, but if and only if the lands are lost rapidly.199 However, the reason 
that a sudden loss evokes sympathy and a sense of unfairness is not just 
because a surprise causes an emotional shock. A sudden and unpredictable 
loss entails lack of warning and an inability to prepare for, mitigate, or 
avoid the loss.200 This underlies the notion that fairness supports the 
avulsion doctrine. 
The predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, and pervasive qualities of 
sea-level rise, therefore, undermine this fairness justification for applying 
the avulsion doctrine even when the change to the coast occurs within a 
short timeframe. Sudden erosion wrought by storms is no longer a random, 
totally unpredictable, isolated, and anomalous event for coastal 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (highlighting that expenditures on coastal protections will force counties to incur great 
costs at the expense of other possible county projects). 
 195. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b (expanding on the losses associated with inundation). 
 196. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 367–68 (describing the effects of sea-level rise in 
differing boundary regimes). 
 197. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 337 (examining the early rationale for the doctrine of 
avulsion). 
 198. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114 
(Fla. 2008) (explaining that the hardship of removing title from an owner due to avulsive events is 
against the public interest). 
 199. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 308, 324 (arguing that the gradualness of the shift in 
boundary diminishes the loser’s sense of loss); Rusk, supra note 4, at 299–300 (explaining that courts 
hesitate to shift boundary lines and burden private land after avulsive events). 
 200. See, e.g., Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1114 (explaining the mitigating purpose of the 
doctrine of avulsion). 
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landowners.201 Many landowners already have firsthand experience with 
the combined impact of sea-level rise and climate change on storm surges, 
and none can be unaware of the experiences along large portions of the 
United States’ coastline in recent years.202 Landowners also have access to 
extensive information regarding likely future impacts.203 Those who decide 
to retain coastal property also have sufficient knowledge and opportunity to 
take steps to mitigate or insure against the associated risks.204 Many coastal 
landowners are building sea walls, elevating structures, and taking other 
measures to try to prolong the useful life of their properties, demonstrating 
their awareness of the threats.205  
This reality undermines the rationale for applying the avulsion doctrine 
—allowing coastal landowners to reclaim submerged land because of the 
hardships occasioned by an unpredictable change. Thus, in an era of sea-
level rise, factors—like the timing of the landowner’s investments and the 
landowner’s actual or imputed knowledge of ongoing erosion of a 
property—may be relevant to the analysis of fairness. Similarly, fairness 
could take account of the degree of hardship an ambulatory boundary 
would cause, including available statutory opportunities for the landowner 
to protect remaining structures.206 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 88. 
 202. E.g., Alvarez & Robles, supra note 148 (chronicling efforts counties in Florida have made 
to prepare for rising sea levels); Urbina, supra note 148 (chronicling the increasing homeowner wariness 
about purchasing coastal properties). 
 203. There are free, publicly available mapping tools. See Office for Coastal Mgmt., NOAA’s 
Sea Level Rise Viewer, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/slr (last updated Nov. 3, 2017) 
(showing growing sea-level rise in an interactive map format); Surging Seas Risk Finder and Mapping 
Tools, CLIMATE CENTRAL, http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (providing 
interactive tools to see maps of areas that are below sea levels and experience flooding). There are also 
federal databases and tools that enable landowners to determine their flood exposure, see whether they 
are in a designated flood zone, and discover the meaning of that designation. See Office for 
Coastal Mgmt., NOAA Coastal Flood Exposure Map, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/fl
ood-exposure.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2017) (showing coastal flood exposure in an interactive map); 
FEMA Flood Map Service Center, FEMA, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/search (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) 
(providing tools to locate specific flood maps by address). In addition, there is a growing cadre of 
private consultants who will assess present and future flooding risk for coastal property owners or 
prospective purchasers. E.g., About Coastal Risk Consulting, COASTAL RISK CONSULTING, 
http://coastalriskconsulting.com/about (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
 204. See, e.g., Ruppert, supra note 31, at 90 (discussing certain permitting guidelines that give 
property owners notice of the risk of sea-level rise). 
 205. See id. at 97 (explaining that shore-armor permitting and beach nourishment efforts are 
attempts to insulate properties from sea-level rise). 
 206.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (reaffirming the relevance of preexisting 
conditions and landowner knowledge about the condition of the property and its likely uses in 
determining the appropriate denominator under the Takings Clause). Justice Kennedy noted that the 
physical characteristics of the property and the likelihood of regulation are relevant to the assessment of 
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Thus, the situation for coastal landowners today is distinct from the 
paradigmatic case frequently invoked to justify applying the avulsion 
doctrine as a matter of fairness—the sympathetic case of the riverine 
property owner whose property becomes divided overnight by a river that 
suddenly and unpredictably cut through an oxbow or moved to a new 
channel.207 This has always been the classic case for applying the avulsion 
doctrine; the fairness rationale justifies providing the landowner 
opportunity to reclaim the property that is now across the river.208 Unlike 
the unlucky riverine landowner, coastal landowners today have notice and 
ability to decide whether they wish to continue to bear the risks associated 
with owning coastal property.209 Thus, the fairness justification offered to 
support the avulsion doctrine no longer makes sense. Although fairness 
may dictate that the avulsion doctrine should apply in a limited universe of 
cases, it will be an increasingly weak rationale as the effects of sea-level 
rise become more pronounced and widely experienced. 
Moreover, the “surprise” narrative that justified the landowner’s right 
to reclaim land after sudden changes is also no longer accurate. The new 
reality that sea-level rise poses means that making broad generalizations 
about the fairness of losing land to the ocean (as a result of sudden and 
perceptible changes, as opposed to a gradual change) is no longer possible. 
                                                                                                                 
the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, which in turn influence the denominator 
determination. Id. at 1945–46. 
 207. Compare Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 88 (describing the situation of present-day 
coastal landowners), with Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 343–44 (describing the difficulties faced by a 
riparian owner on the banks of the Missouri River). See also Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 192, at 31–
32 (noting the inevitable likelihood that maintaining essential public services in many coastal areas 
subject to regular inundation will become impossible or impracticable). 
 208. See, e.g., Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351 (describing state of law as relegating 
avulsion to a minor role, except where there is a shift of a river into a new channel or in the case of a 
short-term change); see id. at 353 (recommending that the rule of accretion apply with a handful of 
exceptions, including a river that shifts to a new channel or cuts through an oxbow). 
 209. It is notable that property values have only recently begun to show signs of incorporating 
this risk. See Urbina, supra note 148 (noting that the real estate industry is slowly awakening to the need 
to incorporate risks of catastrophic damage from climate change into their pricing). In assessing the 
fairness of any given rule or outcome, it seems fair to consider that landowners have had an opportunity 
to exit the coastal property market and have not chosen to do so. While some may not have the resources 
to do so, given the large number of vacation and rental properties along much of Florida’s coast, many 
clearly have the financial ability to do so but choose not to. In contrast, in locations where low-income 
and otherwise vulnerable populations live in coastal areas, fairness should remain a central, relevant 
consideration.  
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3. Protection of the Sovereign/Public Interest and Archaic Assumptions 
About Predictability, Directionality, Frequency, and Scope of Change 
As Professor Sax notes, early English common law valued protecting 
the sovereign’s interest in previously submerged lands.210 Specifically, 
early British courts and commentators noted that privatizing large segments 
of coastal land might impair the king’s strategic interest in controlling the 
coast.211 For this reason, courts took pains to clarify that interfering with 
sovereign interests could override other factors supporting a shift in title.212 
This rationale of protecting the sovereign/public interest remains 
relevant in an era of sea-level rise.213 The sovereign continues to have a 
strong interest in the outcome of littoral boundary determinations and 
control over submerged lands held in trust for the public.214 However, the 
nature of the sovereign’s interest has significantly changed.  
Today, the sovereign’s interest in land that becomes submerged 
because of erosion is less likely to be military or strategic, and more likely 
to reflect the contours of the public trust doctrine—emphasizing public use 
for navigation, bathing and fishing, and protecting public health, safety, and 
the environment.215 In Florida, the state constitution, statutes, and case law 
reflect the strength of the state’s interest in preserving a foreshore that is 
accessible to the public and sandy beaches that are open for public use.216 
The new reality of predictable, unidirectional, and geographically 
pervasive change amplifies this rationale’s importance. The public interests 
and values associated with the foreshore are at considerable risk in an era of  
                                                                                                                 
 210. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 312 (discussing the sovereign’s right to rapidly 
exposed littoral land).  
 211. Id. at 325. 
 212. See id. at 312 (justifying transfer of title to private owners during accretion based on the de 
minimis rationale). 
 213. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 84–85 (describing the public trust doctrine and its 
relevance to properties likely to be submerged due to sea-level rise).  
 214. See id. (offering an example of the state’s interest in control over submerged lands). 
 215. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 323 n.15 (1973) (“The extent of the 
State’s interests should not be narrowly construed because it is denominated a navigational purpose.”).  
 216. See FLA CONST. art. X, § 11 (providing that the state holds title in public trust all lands 
under navigable lands, including beaches below the MHWL); FLA. STAT. § 161.101 (2012) (recognizing 
beach erosion as a statewide problem and creating a state-initiated program of beach restoration and 
nourishment); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974) (“No part of 
Florida is more exclusively hers, nor more properly utilized by her people than her beaches. And the 
right of the public of access to, and enjoyment of, Florida’s oceans and beaches has long been 
recognized by this Court.”); White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939) (“We love the oceans which 
surround our State. We . . . enjoy bathing in their refreshing waters. The constant enjoyment of this 
privilege of thus using the ocean and its fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove sufficient to 
establish it as an American common law right . . . .”). 
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predictable, unidirectional, ongoing, and geographically pervasive 
erosion.217 The sovereign interest in and duty to protect the public’s right to 
bathe, fish, navigate, and walk on the foreshore is at risk if there is no 
publicly owned foreshore or—in a more extreme case—if members of the 
public are separated from the water by private land (both dry and 
submerged).218 Occasional, episodic, and bidirectional changes of limited 
geographic scope do not pose a comparable threat to these interests.219 
The state also has an interest in protecting other increasingly 
recognized ecological values of the area where dry land and sea meet.220 
Dunes and other coastal features also provide natural protection against 
storms and flooding, not just for littoral property, but also for property and 
citizens living inland.221 If these naturally protective features are eroding, 
the state may have a strong interest in restoring them, especially when 
restoration is feasible and cost-effective. Thus, control over newly 
submerged lands may be critical to the state’s ability to protect public 
health, safety, and the environment. 
In eras when coastal change was occasional and limited, the impact on 
the sovereign’s interest was correspondingly small.222 Thus, consideration 
of the sovereign’s interest was, in some sense, pro forma in the early 
cases.223 Today, the ongoing and pervasive change along the coast 
intensifies the public interest and brings this consideration to the fore.224 
This analysis suggests that the facts associated with sea-level rise intensify 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 645. 
 218. Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 356. 
 219. Id. at 325 (discussing how de minimis changes did not threaten the sovereign’s interests). 
 220. In Florida, the area below the MHWL can include nesting habitat for sea turtles and critical 
habitat for other species. Blair Witherington et al., Sea Turtle Responses to Barriers on Their Nesting 
Beach, 401 J.  EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 1, 1 (2011).  
 221. See generally OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS & WATERSHEDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, 842-R-15-002, GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARISE DURING MUNICIPAL 
OPERATIONS, CASE STUDY: NORTH AND SOUTH RIVERS WATERSHED ASSOCIATION RAIN GARDENS 
(2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/green_infrastructure_roadshow.p 
df (examining the impact of coastal-improvement projects on water quality); JEFFREY ODEFEY ET AL., 
AMERICAN RIVERS, BANKING ON GREEN: A LOOK AT HOW GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE CAN SAVE 
MUNICIPALITIES MONEY AND PROVIDE ECONOMIC BENEFITS COMMUNITY-WIDE 24 (2012), https://s3. 
amazonaws.com/american-rivers-website/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/06142720/banking-on-green-rep 
ort.pdf (“Naturally occurring ‘green infrastructure’ such as dune systems, wetlands (also known as 
living shorelines), and salt marshes can provide water storage and retention areas, mitigate tidal surges, 
reduce coastal erosion, and help to alleviate coastal flooding.”). 
 222. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 313 (discussing the original rationale behind the 
accretion doctrine). 
 223. See id. at 308, 309 (referring to views on historical deference to the sovereign Crown). 
 224. See Jen Van Allen, Coastal Access: “Interests in Tension,” ISLANDS INST. 2, 3 (Oct. 24, 
2016), http://www.islandinstitute.org/working-waterfront/coastal-access-‘interests-tension’ (diving into 
current public access issues in Maine). 
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the nature of the sovereign’s interests. The pace and magnitude of the 
change, coupled with the ongoing, pervasive trend toward inundation 
clearly implicates a primary sovereign interest—protecting public safety.225 
Unidirectional, predictable, ongoing, and pervasive change also poses a 
particular threat to the sovereign’s interest in protecting public beach and 
water access and ecological systems. 
Moreover, the sovereign’s interests have weight because of not only its 
police power and duty to protect the public, but also the sovereign’s 
interests as a landowner.226 Joseph Sax highlighted the implications of 
considering the sovereign’s role not just as regulator, but also as trustee of 
sovereign submerged lands with a duty to protect the public’s interest in 
these lands and navigation.227 This threefold strand of sovereign interests 
may offer the most robust grounds for courts and litigants seeking to adapt 
the doctrines to the realities of sea-level rise. This rationale provides a 
compelling reason to favor ambulatory boundaries that move as the shore 
erodes. This would better enable the sovereign to protect these various 
interests and fulfill its duties. 
4. Productive Use of Land/Social Utility and Archaic Assumptions About 
Directionality, Frequency, and Scope of Change 
A theme in the cases awarding private landowners newly accreted 
lands is their ability to make productive use of the newly created or exposed 
land.228 Commentators and courts have adverted to the value of having a 
clear owner who can use the land or of having an existing owner who 
currently makes productive use of the land.229 However, disputes over 
ownership of submerged lands weaken the relevance of this rationale. Cases 
of newly created or exposed land implicate the value of productive use of 
land—a value that the accretion doctrine advanced.230 Given that inundation 
of property is a fact that will predominate in an era of sea-level rise, the 
value of productive use and ownership of newly exposed or created land is 
not implicated in the same way. 
Of course, in cases of erosion or submersion, landowners can still 
assert an interest in productive use of their land. Indeed, the avulsion 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See also Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 52, 56, 76–77 (noting how state interest in 
public safety might be met with legal obstacles).  
 226. See Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 641–43. 
 227. Id. at 651. 
 228. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 323–25, 333 (showing how productive use of land can 
correlate to awarded land via accretion). 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. 
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doctrine envisions that the landowner will somehow reclaim submerged 
lands, if reclamation is feasible within a reasonable time.231 This aligns with 
both the fairness rationale and the productive-use rationale. Presumably, a 
landowner would only invest in reclaiming lands if she was using or 
believed she could use these lands productively. However, when inundation 
occurs because of significant, ongoing, and geographically pervasive sea-
level rise, the landowners’ desire to reclaim and use inundated land is not 
innocuous. In many settings, reclamation may be socially undesirable and 
create significant externalities that other landowners and the public will 
bear.232 In some cases, it may put public health and safety at risk.233 
Moreover, allowing landowners to use this land could interfere with 
navigation, water access, and other strongly protected public trust rights.234 
Thus, the notion of productive use of land takes on a very different aspect 
in the context of sea-level rise. 
As noted above, the rationale of promoting productive use of land by 
ensuring that all lands have an owner has not been prominent in cases of 
erosion.235 Courts typically invoked the rationale only in cases involving 
newly formed dry land that landowners could use productively.236 This 
rationale falls away when applied in the context of sea-level rise, as in other 
cases involving erosion. 
Alternatively, one could argue that, while the underlying rationale 
remains relevant, the context of sea-level rise turns it on its head. Instead of 
providing a rationale for allowing littoral landowners to claim newly 
formed land, the considerable social value associated with public use of 
submerged lands provides an argument against allowing landowners to 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 307–08 (providing historical context on why avulsion has different rules then 
accretion); see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 (Fla. 
2008) (stating that the doctrine of avulsion recognizes owner’s “right to reclaim the lost land within a 
reasonable time”). 
 232. For example, in many settings, landowners’ only feasible option is to construct a seawall to 
reclaim and protect submerged areas. Anne Schindler, Building a Great Wall—on Our Eastern Border, 
FIRSTCOAST NEWS (Oct. 20, 2016, 9:21 PM), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/local/building-a-
great-wall-on-our-eastern-border/339378027. Seawalls frequently accelerate the pace of erosion on 
adjacent properties as well as any beach in front of them. Id. 
 233. Climate Change Impacts to U.S. Coasts Threaten Public Health, Safety and Economy, 
NOAA (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2013/20130125_coastalclimateimpacts.ht
ml (looking at direct and indirect effects of climate change on coastal communities). 
 234. See Sax, Rising Sea Levels, supra note 5, at 644 (explaining that landowners making 
reclamation efforts have a duty to provide public access to the water). 
 235. See discussion supra Part II.B (considering how these factual changes undermine the 
rationales that supported the application of the ambulatory boundaries framework).  
 236. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 324–25 (explaining the justification for rewarding 
accreted land to existing owners). 
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retain control after lands are submerged.237 Of course, one can also argue 
that the right accorded by the avulsion doctrine in cases of sudden and 
dramatic change preserves the landowner’s ability to make productive use 
of the submerged land through reclamation. However, as sea level rises, 
reclamation will become practically impossible and, in some settings, 
dangerous.238 Thus, even if this rationale survives in the ambulatory 
boundaries framework, it offers less support for the avulsion doctrine than it 
does outside the sea-level rise context. 
5. Access to Water and Archaic Assumptions About Directionality of 
Change 
The final rationale offered to support the ambulatory boundaries 
framework is preserving littoral landowners’ access to water. As noted 
above, this has become the predominant rationale of concern under United 
States case law.239 However, the concern that landowners may lose access 
to the water arises only in scenarios involving newly exposed or accreted 
lands placed in public ownership.240 In a context of unidirectional change—
where land primarily and persistently erodes—the landowner retains access 
to the water regardless of whether the boundary is static or dynamic.241 In 
other words, access to water is no longer an issue. Thus, the rationale that 
modern American courts rely on most prominently to justify applying the 
ambulatory boundaries framework is of questionable relevance in the 
context of sea-level rise. 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Indeed, a rationale offered by early commentators to justify the doctrine of accretion—that 
the newly created land became in fact part of the land, so it made sense that it should become part of the 
tract at law—would argue for making newly submerged lands part of the waters rather than maintaining 
them as part of the land. See id. at 320 n.76 (describing commentary by Lord Hale). 
 238. See also Susumu Yasuda et al., Characteristics of Liquefaction in Tokyo Bay Area by the 
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, 52 SOILS & FOUND. 793, 794 (2013) (describing the dangers of 
reclaimed land in Japan after the 2011 earthquake). 
 239. See supra Part II.B.5 (collecting cases and treatises that identify this as the most prevalent 
rationale under U.S. law). 
 240. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 988 So. 2d 1102, 1105–
07, 1121 (Fla. 2008) (illustrating how beach restoration and renourishment may still lead to landowner 
claims of denial of access to water). In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the landowners’ 
claim that beach renourishment pursuant to Florida’s statutory scheme unconstitutionally took the 
landowner’s right of access. Id. 
 241. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 346 (concluding that boundaries should follow a river’s 
movement, no matter the form of the movement). 
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III. CLEARING AWAY THE DEBRIS: DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LAW IN 
A POST-AMBULATORY BOUNDARIES LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Part II described how five factual predicates for the development and 
application of ambulatory boundaries framework are absent or unfounded 
in an era of sea-level rise. Part II also described how these factual changes 
affect the viability of the rationales that supported applying the ambulatory 
boundaries framework. It illustrated how the coastal context resulting from 
sea-level rise fundamentally transforms the fairness and public interest 
rationales. It also detailed how the de minimis, social-utility, and access-to-
water rationales retain limited, if any, relevance. This section turns to the 
doctrinal implications of the changed factual reality of sea-level rise and 
outlines two possible paths for courts to take in resolving coastal boundary 
issues in this changed factual context. 
The genius of common law is its ability to evolve as it encounters new 
situations. This section begins by addressing the general question of the 
circumstances under which common law judges can and should find that 
changed facts support changed outcomes. This discussion uses the term 
“doctrinally relevant” to describe facts that affect either the choice of the 
appropriate and applicable rule in a given case, or the outcome of applying 
a given rule. Both explicit, factual predicates for a given legal rule and facts 
that bear on the rationales for applying the relevant legal rule can be 
doctrinally relevant. 
A change in a doctrinally relevant fact can affect a court’s ruling on 
two different levels. At a superficial level, it can affect the court’s decision 
on how to apply the rule, and potentially affect the outcome of the case.242 
In other words, the same rule can apply in two cases, but the presence or 
absence of a particular fact may change the court’s analysis, and may even 
determine a different outcome. 
The second more fundamental level at which facts can affect a court’s 
decision is when the presence or absence of a particular fact affects the 
selection of the applicable law.243 To give a very basic example, in criminal 
law, if the case involves unauthorized entry into a home and removal of an 
object, the offense is generally burglary.244 However, if the case involves 
authorized entry and removal of an object, the offense is typically theft, but 
                                                                                                                 
 242. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955) (holding that absence of 
a finding of intent to cause harm supports a conclusion that no battery occurred). 
 243. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1954) (finding that circumstances of the case 
did not warrant application of the rule governing enforcement of a contract made while intoxicated, but 
fell instead under the general rule governing contracts). 
 244. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 (2017) (defining burglary). 
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not burglary.245 The presence or absence of unauthorized entry determines 
the applicable rule. This occurs when facts are elements of a given legal 
claim. It can also occur even where the fact is not an identified predicate or 
element of a claim.246 
Therefore, if a court determines that the effects of sea-level rise 
constitute doctrinally relevant facts, it must subsequently determine how the 
facts affect the analysis. The court can: (a) factor the effects of sea-level 
rise into its analysis and potentially reach a different result under the 
ambulatory boundaries framework; or (b) recognize that the effects of sea-
level rise warrant applying different legal principles from the traditional 
ambulatory boundaries framework. After a discussion of how courts 
determine which facts have doctrinal relevance in Part III.A, Parts III.B and 
III.C explore these two approaches. Part III.B considers a first option: the 
conservative approach. Under this approach, courts will apply the 
ambulatory boundaries framework, but explicitly recognize that the effects 
of sea-level rise necessitate changes in how the doctrines are applied. This 
will align the ambulatory boundaries framework with the rationales that 
support its application. 
Part III.C considers a second, more comprehensive approach. A court 
could conclude that the common law framework is, by its terms, 
inapplicable in this new setting. It could then apply the remaining 
substantive body of law that governs property boundaries and ownership, 
public trust, and submerged lands without the overlay of the ambulatory 
boundaries framework. Part III.C then examines how these bodies of law, 
composed of constitutional, statutory, and common laws, might apply to 
coastal properties in the absence of the ambulatory boundaries framework.  
Finally, Part III.D anticipates some of the arguments against adapting 
or supplanting the traditional framework, including the argument that the 
latter approach constitutes a change in settled law that denies property 
owners due process, or constitutes a “judicial taking” without just 
compensation. 
A. The Relevance of Changed Facts: What’s a Court to Do? 
A basic premise of our common law tradition is that judges decide 
cases by applying the principle of stare decisis. They employ the techniques 
of reasoning-by-analogy and distinguishing cases to determine whether a 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. § 3921 (defining theft). 
 246. See M.B.W. Sinclair, The Semantics of Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L. REV. 373, 
378–80 (1986) (explaining what predicates are and how they apply in a legal context). 
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prior decision is binding precedent to a subsequent case.247 This requires 
identifying “doctrinally relevant” facts, such that the presence or absence of 
the fact affects the choice of rule or the outcome of the case when the court 
applies the rule.248 Thus, judges confronted with two cases—only one of 
which involves a doctrinally relevant fact—may arrive at different 
decisions either because (1) different rules govern the two cases; or 
(2) because the same rule, properly applied to the facts, produces divergent 
results. 
Courts may find two different categories of facts doctrinally relevant. 
The first category is composed of facts that constitute elements of a 
particular rule. The second category is composed of facts so critical to 
applying the rule that they can affect the choice of rule or outcome, even 
though they are not elements of the rule. In the first category, the fact is 
already recognized as a requisite for applying the prior decision or rule.249 
In the second category, the fact’s relationship to the rationale underlying the 
rule determines its significance to the outcome.250 The argument elaborated 
in more detail below is that, when confronted with the changed reality of 
sea-level rise, courts applying the ambulatory boundaries framework should 
find that the effects of sea-level rise are facts that fall into the second 
category and are therefore doctrinally relevant. 
Under stare decisis, courts are bound to apply the applicable law 
similarly to cases involving similar facts.251 However, where doctrinally 
relevant facts differ in two cases, courts may decide: (1) that the same legal 
principle or rule applies, but factual distinctions warrant a different 
outcome; or (2) that a different legal principle or rule applies to the two 
cases.252 In other words, courts employ the techniques of reasoning-by-
analogy and distinguishing cases at two distinct levels of application: 
application of the rule to the facts and selection of the relevant rule.253 
In the first situation, a court distinguishes two cases because it 
identified a material factual difference from a prior decision that affects 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 457 
(1975) (explaining the history of precedent). 
 248. Id. at 356 (commenting on the different ways that a court may decide a case, despite 
sometimes having similar facts). 
 249. E.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955) (stating that intent to cause 
harm is a requirement for battery, no matter the circumstances or character of that intent). 
 250. E.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1954) (finding that the evidence did not 
support the conclusion that the defendant was sufficiently intoxicated, to warrant application of the rule 
invalidating contracts made while unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument 
executed).  
 251. Jones, supra note 247, at 456. 
 252. Id. at 456–57. 
 253. Id. at 458. 
134 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:089 
how a particular principle or rule applies to the case before it.254 In such a 
case, the court has already identified a legal doctrine or principle that 
applies to both cases. Thus, the factual difference does not affect that 
determination. However, the court may conclude that material factual 
differences warrant a different analysis and outcome.255 For example, 
consider a case in which one landowner (P) claims that a boundary has been 
modified by estoppel. Assume that the neighboring landowner (D) 
expressly permitted P to use land within the actual boundaries of D’s 
property up to a fence D built that was several feet inside D’s boundary. 
Assume further that P used the land and subsequently built her own fence 
abutting D’s fence. If D now seeks to preclude P from using the area within 
D’s boundaries, P may claim that a new boundary at the fence line has been 
established by estoppel. 
A court might decide that—although a plaintiff proves the strict 
elements of boundary-by-estoppel256—material factual differences from 
prior cases warrant distinguishing the situation. For example, the evidence 
might show that D merely tried to be a good neighbor, reasonably believed 
that P knew that D was merely granting a permissive use of D’s land, and 
had no warning that P would build a fence. In such a case, a court might 
decide that boundary-by-estoppel should not apply because the primary 
rationale underlying estoppel is preventing wrongful conduct. Therefore, 
innocent, good faith acts should not qualify.257 Thus, the court might 
conclude that, based on these facts and notwithstanding existing law, no 
estoppel should be found.258 
Courts engage in a somewhat similar but distinct process when they 
decide that a particular principle or rule applied in a prior case should not 
be applied in a subsequent case because of factual differences between the 
two cases.259 This arises when a case arguably could be decided under 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. The elements for proving boundary–by-estoppel in a majority of jurisdictions are an 
express or implied (by conduct) misrepresentation of the boundary by the party to be estopped, and 
reliance on the misrepresentation by another party who lacks notice of the truth. Notice of the truth is 
also required for the party to be estopped, but such notice can be actual or imputed. POWELL, supra note 
6, § 68.04[5][a]. 
 257. See, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1970) (reiterating that equitable 
estoppel pleas are not sufficient when based on mistaken actions). 
 258.  See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.04[2] (explaining how the rigorous factual requirements 
negate potential estoppel claims); see, e.g., Benz v. St. Paul, 93 N.W. 1038, 1040 (Minn. 1903) 
(declining to find boundary-by-estoppel where landowner to be estopped did not have actual knowledge 
of where boundary was in relation to the house plaintiff built). 
 259. In their book, Reason in Law, Lief Carter and Thomas Burke term this “fact freedom.” LIEF 
H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 28 (8th ed. 2010) (“We call judicial freedom to 
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either of two legal principles or rules.260 The court may find that relevant 
factual differences between a prior and a subsequent case affect the court’s 
decision as to which legal framework or principle should apply.261 For 
example, consider a case that can arguably be resolved under two different 
property law principles, such as boundary-by-acquiescence and boundary-
by-estoppel.262 In this case, assume that our landowner (P) claims that the 
boundary with a neighbor’s (D’s) property has been modified by 
acquiescence. Again, assume that P used land up to a fence that ran several 
feet inside D’s boundary. P might cite prior cases with similar facts (e.g., a 
case where the actual owner acquiesced to P’s use of property up to an 
existing fence that was not on the boundary) to support her claim. However, 
a court could decide that the boundary-by-acquiescence doctrine does not 
control the case because the length of time does not justify invoking the 
underlying rationale of favoring diligent landowners and disfavoring 
landowners who sleep on their rights.263 Instead, the court might find that 
the boundary-by-estoppel doctrine controls the case. 264 The presence or 
absence of a particular fact—in the example, a sufficient length of time—
determines that different rules apply in two factually similar cases. 
By analogy, the factual differences between current cases and earlier 
cases resulting from sea-level rise could lead a court to conclude either: 
(1) that the factual context of sea-level rise is doctrinally relevant and must 
be considered in applying the ambulatory boundaries framework; or (2) that 
the factual context of sea-level rise so directly and substantially undermines 
the rationales for applying the ambulatory boundaries framework that they 
should no longer apply. Part III.B illustrates the first path: a court applying 
the ambulatory boundaries framework, but taking account of the doctrinally 
relevant factual differences. Part III.C describes the second path: a court 
determining that, in light of the factual differences, the ambulatory 
boundaries framework does not apply in the context of sea-level rise. 
                                                                                                                 
choose the governing precedent by selectively sifting the facts of prior cases and weighing their relative 
significance fact freedom.”). 
 260. Id. at 27. 
 261. Id. at 29. 
 262. Id. at 43–47. 
 263. See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.05[1][c] (explaining how firm time periods and other 
technicalities may limit certain property claims); see Wells v. Williamson, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (Idaho 
1990) (outlining the rationales underlying boundary-by-acquiescence). 
 264. See POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.04[4] & [5][a] (stating practical location may establish 
boundary-by-estoppel). 
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B. Option One: Apply the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework with Explicit 
Consideration of the Changed Factual Context 
Because the changes presented by sea-level rise undermine and 
transform the rationales for the ambulatory boundaries framework, courts 
should, at least, take account of material facts in their analysis when 
applying the law to the facts before them. In doing so, courts will find that, 
in many cases, some of the rationales for applying the doctrine have 
become irrelevant, such as the de minimis rationale, preservation of access 
to water, and ensuring productive use of land. Other rationales, such as 
fairness and protection of the public interest, remain relevant, but the 
changed facts may turn the rationales on their heads, justifying completely 
different results. 
Confronted with this challenge, courts should acknowledge that the 
facts presented in a context of sea-level rise are significantly different from 
those that existed historically. In appropriate cases, courts could find that 
these facts are different in ways that are materially relevant to applying the 
ambulatory boundaries framework. These changed facts undermine key 
assumptions and rationales for applying the specific doctrines. This section 
offers a conservative approach for courts to account for these factual 
changes. This approach focuses on the close connection between the 
historic factual predicates and the rationales that support the doctrines.265 
Under this approach, a court explicitly acknowledges that the changed 
context presented by sea-level rise requires rethinking the rationales that 
support applying the ambulatory boundaries framework.266 Therefore, in 
applying the doctrines, the court considers how the changed facts affect the 
underlying rationales.267 Rationales that are no longer relevant in the 
context of sea-level rise should not weigh in a court’s analysis. Rationales 
that are still logically relevant may require courts to reconsider what result 
will achieve the purpose of the doctrines, potentially affecting the analysis 
and the outcome in an era of sea-level rise. If applying the doctrine directly 
conflicts with the rationales that support the doctrine, courts should 
reconsider the doctrine’s application to the facts of a particular case. 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See Flatt, supra note 13, at 290–91 (enumerating a similar approach that seeks to adapt 
statutes while maintaining a focus on the underlying purposes of the law). 
 266. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46, 47–48 (describing effects of accretion, avulsion and 
erosion on littoral rights); Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 67–68 (explaining doctrines of 
accretion, erosion and avulsion).  
 267. See Christie, supra note 3, at 46–48 (describing the effects of accretion, avulsion, and 
erosion on littoral rights); Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 67–68 (explaining doctrines of 
accretion, erosion, and avulsion). 
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The analysis in Part II.B demonstrates that the de minimis, social-
utility, and access-to-water rationales are no longer viable in the context of 
sea-level rise. Arguably, courts should no longer recite these by rote or rely 
on them to justify application of the ambulatory boundaries framework. 
Focusing on the difficult, but important questions of fairness, and the broad 
dimensions of public interest in coastal boundaries could produce a sounder 
application of the ambulatory boundaries framework—one that better 
achieves the doctrines’ purposes. 
In some cases, rationales that are invoked by rote as supporting the 
avulsion doctrine no longer support the same outcome.268 Moreover, in 
some cases, fairness may dictate overriding application of the accretion 
doctrine.269 By undertaking a meaningful and nuanced analysis of the 
values that remain relevant, courts ensure that the doctrines serve their 
purpose, rather than applying them mechanically and in ways that ignore 
reality. 
This proposed path represents a conservative approach to the challenge 
that sea-level rise presents for the ambulatory boundaries framework, but it 
could nevertheless dramatically affect outcomes. Rather than being bound 
by the tyranny of the fast-slow distinction—with its significant information 
costs, lack of predictability, seemingly arbitrary results, and doctrinal 
incoherence—courts consider the values that the doctrines will serve: 
fairness and protecting the public interest. Admittedly, these rationales 
require courts to better define what achieves fairness and protects the public 
interest in this new era, but courts face similar challenges in applying many 
legal doctrines.270 Through this method, courts will focus on protecting 
meaningful social values, rather than determining whether and how much 
of the erosion in a given case was caused by events observable by a person 
unaided by technology, with all the absurd subsidiary questions that inquiry 
entails.271 
C. Option Two: Set Aside the Ambulatory Boundaries Framework 
Part III.B offers the conservative approach that a court might take 
when confronted with the challenge of applying the ambulatory boundaries 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 351–53 (describing cases where courts arbitrarily 
followed doctrinal precedent and engaged in wasteful disputation). 
 269. Id. 
 270. E.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50 
(1984) (describing how courts have moved away from traditional doctrines of autonomy and self-
determination in contract law to fairness and social justice). 
 271. See Sax, Accretion, supra note 4, at 352–55 (proposing courts change their analysis of 
property interests to include public use and environmental concerns). 
138 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:089 
framework in the context of sea-level rise. This section outlines an 
alternative and comprehensive path: reconsidering whether the ambulatory 
boundaries framework is the proper law to apply in this context. If a court 
concludes that the ambulatory boundaries framework does not apply to 
cases of coastal erosion in an era of sea-level rise, the most logical and 
arguably correct outcome is not to apply the framework. It is 
unquestionably the province of courts to determine the applicable law.272 
Moreover, cases in which parties argue for the application of competing 
legal frameworks to a single set of facts are common. Courts routinely 
resolve these questions.273 This part outlines what that approach might look 
like. 
If one removes the erosion-avulsion overlay from the picture, several 
important bodies of law remain for courts to apply.274 First, under real 
property law, there are doctrines that determine boundaries to property.275 
As a general matter, the land descriptions in a deed typically establish 
boundaries.276 In general, those boundaries do not change absent voluntary 
conveyance or the exercise of eminent domain.277 This seems to suggest 
applying a rigid rule that permanently fixes boundaries without regard to 
the movement of the sea. However, common law has always included 
numerous exceptions to this basic principle, including the doctrines of 
adverse possession, post-conveyance agreement, estoppel, and 
acquiescence.278 These exceptions serve rationales similar to those 
incorporated in the ambulatory boundaries framework—including fairness, 
promoting the productive use of land, and efficiency.279 Similarly, although 
                                                                                                                 
 272. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS SERIES: CIVIL PROCEDURE 93, 96 (3d 
ed., Thomas Reuters 2012).  
 273. See supra Part III.A (examining the use of precedent and stare decisis). 
 274. As noted earlier, these doctrines function as an overlay on background legal principles that 
would otherwise require a transfer of property in order to change ownership of the disputed area. See 
Sax, supra note 4, at 311–12 (discussing alternative bodies of law). 
 275. POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.02.  
 276. See TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 990 (“The language of the conveyance by which the land is 
sought to be identified is usually referred to as the ‘description.’”). In Florida, there is also a statutory 
overlay on the common law specifying that the seaward boundary of littoral property is the MHWL. 
FLA. STAT. § 177.28 (2016). Subsection (2) of this provision states: “No provision of this part shall be 
deemed to modify the common law of this state with respect to the legal effects of accretion, reliction, 
erosion, or avulsion.” Id. § 177.28(2). This subsection would simply have no relevance if erosion and 
avulsion did not apply to a given context. 
 277. POWELL, supra note 6, § 68.02. 
 278. Id. § 68.05[1][d]. 
 279. Id. § 91.01[4] (explaining that adverse possession serves the policy of maintaining what 
has become the status quo when the costs of wrestling the land may be too great); id. § 82.01[3] 
(explaining that recording acts are aimed at protecting purchasers who had no prior notice of ownership 
over the property and make property law self-executing and efficient); id.§§ 68.059[c], [d] (explaining 
that the doctrine of recognition and acquisition aims to fulfill equitable policies); see also Sax, 
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doctrines and statutes define the requirements for a valid voluntary transfer 
of land, numerous exceptions that shift ownership without a valid transfer, 
including estoppel, exist in a variety of situations.280 Moreover, the 
protections afforded bona fide purchasers under common law, as codified in 
state recording statutes,281 can override these rules and invalidate voluntary 
transfers, or give effect to otherwise invalid transfers. 
Thus, the law that defines boundaries and generally requires a 
voluntary transfer or exercise of eminent domain to transfer title to land is 
the first point of reference for courts seeking to determine the effect of a 
changed coastline on property rights.282 Ordinarily, absent circumstances 
that require applying an exception, the existing law retains the boundaries 
of a littoral property, notwithstanding the movement of the MHWL. 
However, determining the location of a boundary generally begins with the 
description of the property in the deed.283  
In Florida, the seaward boundary of littoral property is the MHWL.284 
Grants from the state that are not exceptional grants of sovereign 
submerged lands cannot extend seaward of that line.285 Boundaries 
described with reference to the MHWL create a presumption that the parties 
intended the boundary to be ambulatory.286 Of course, there may be cases in 
which a specific surveyed description of the MHWL at the time of the grant 
is included in a deed.287 In such cases, parties can argue that they intended 
the boundary to remain fixed at that location. However, even when the 
parties describe the specific geographic location of the water’s edge as the 
boundary, courts frequently find that the parties intended to use the water’s 
edge as the boundary, departing from the rule of strict construction.288 Thus, 
beginning from the property description, a court may find that the parties 
generally intended to use the ambulatory water’s edge as the boundary, 
instead of a fixed surveyed location. This argues in favor of a rule allowing 
                                                                                                                 
Accretion, supra note 4, at 323–24, 340 (explaining that ambulatory borders promote land efficiency 
and fairness). 
 280. See TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1230 (explaining estoppel by deed); id. § 966 nn.4–5 
(explaining estoppel based on part performance or reliance). 
 281. POWELL, supra note 6, § 82.01[3].  
 282. TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 1220. 
 283. Id. 
 284. FLA. STAT. § 177.28(1) (1974). 
 285. See id. (providing that no waiver of state ownership over submerged lands is valid). 
 286. See id. § 253.12(9) (providing that state grant of tidally influenced lands are in the public 
interest, and that the boundary between state and private land will be ambulatory). 
 287. See, e.g., Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 
2008) (highlighting how rising sea levels effectively change deeded land in coastal property rights). 
 288. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.03[1].   
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the boundary to move, in order to respect the construction of the property 
description in the deed or grant. 
Because littoral property bounds on sovereign submerged lands, its 
boundaries raise an additional question. How does or should the law treat 
additions to the stock of submerged lands in the absence of the doctrines of 
erosion and avulsion? The body of law governing these lands held in the 
public trust is rich and extensive.289 In Florida, both the state constitution 
and common law clarify the special status accorded to sovereign submerged 
lands.290 The strength and importance of the public’s claim on these lands, 
the limited right of the sovereign to convey them, and the importance of the 
right of navigability and recreation in the ocean all suggest the need for 
great caution in allowing newly submerged lands to pass into private 
ownership. 
Even the doctrine of avulsion, as it currently operates, gives 
landowners a very qualified right in cases of erosion: the right to reclaim 
newly submerged land.291 Thus, to the extent that the law affords a littoral 
landowner a right to newly submerged land under the avulsion doctrine, 
that right is limited to reclaiming the submerged land within a reasonable 
time.292 The very limited nature of this right to reclaim is noteworthy. 
Unlike in cases of accretion, the avulsion doctrine does not award title to 
the littoral landowner; it merely provides a right to reclaim.293 This protects 
the strong public trust interest in the submerged lands. The strength of this 
interest is also evinced in the Florida Constitution, which limits the 
sovereign’s ability to alienate sovereign submerged lands absent a finding 
that such alienation is in the public interest.294 Both the strong constitutional 
protection accorded sovereign submerged lands in Florida, and the weak 
protection afforded the previous owner of newly submerged lands under the 
ambulatory boundaries framework, point to allowing the boundary to move 
landward as sea level rises. 
                                                                                                                 
 289. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109–14 (discussing detailed history of public versus 
private property issues). 
 290. See supra Part.I.A. (discussing the status of submerged lands under Florida common law 
and Florida statutes). 
 291. TIFFANY, supra note 54, § 666. 
 292. See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117 (“[W]hen an avulsive event leads to the loss of 
land, the doctrine of avulsion recognizes the affected property owner’s right to reclaim the lost land 
within a reasonable time.”). 
 293. In New York, the right to reclaim is stronger. See New York v. Realty Assocs., 176 N.E. 
171, 172 (N.Y. 1931) (accepting the doctrine that sudden submergence does not divest the private owner 
of title pending reclamation; title remains in the riparian owner). 
 294. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (“Sale of [sovereign submerged] lands may be authorized . . . only 
when in the public interest. Private use of [these] lands may be authorized by law, but only when not 
contrary to the public interest.”). 
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Moreover, allowing landowners to exclude the public from expanses of 
the wet sand area, and eventually even areas below the mean low-water 
mark, would inevitably interfere with public rights to navigate, bathe, fish, 
and otherwise enjoy the waters of the state. The primacy and importance of 
these rights is well established.295 If these public trust rights do not 
sufficiently justify ensuring that submerged lands remain in public 
ownership, the state’s economic dependence on beach tourism adds to the 
policy reasons for protecting public access to the beaches and waters of the 
state.296 
Practical considerations also point to this direction. A rule that leaves 
the property boundary fixed, even as the boundary moves farther from 
shore, would create innumerable practical problems. Walton County, 
located in Florida’s panhandle region, has already experienced intense 
conflicts because littoral landowners installed fences to enclose the beach 
above what they believed to be the MHWL, in efforts to exclude the public 
from the dry sand beach.297 Many beachfront owners posted signs intended 
to keep the public off the dry sand beach, without a clear understanding that 
the public may have already acquired rights to use the dry sand beach under 
the doctrine of customary use.298 The resulting conflict led the county 
commission to develop an ordinance that sought to mediate the conflict 
between the public’s rights and the landowner’s interests.299 
A rule that encourages landowners to continue to think of submerged 
lands as their private property would extend this type of conflict from the 
dry sand into the waters themselves. In this setting, the potential for 
landowner interference with navigation and beachgoers’ access to the water 
would intensify the challenges local or state governments face in 
developing rules to regulate landowner conduct and protect the public 
interest. According landowners title to submerged lands would also 
                                                                                                                 
 295. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 1106 (describing these rights as an easement to the public 
from the state). 
 296. See Christie, supra note 3, at 38 (listing the benefits accrued from beach restoration). 
 297. Walton Update, supra note 34; Dotty Nist, Citizens Ask Commissioners to Ensure Public 
Access and Use of the Beach, THE DEFUNIAK HERALD (Mar 28, 2016), https://defuniakherald.com/ 
uncategorized/citizens-ask-commissioners-to-ensure-public-access-and-use-of-the-beach/. 
 298. Wheeler, Walton Comm’n, supra note 28. 
 299.  Id. It achieves this through a zoning strategy that creates a 15-foot buffer zone measured 
seaward from the toe of the dune or any permanent habitable structure (whichever is farther seaward). 
Public use is prohibited in the buffer zone, but the public’s customary use is protected on the remainder 
of the beach. Walton County Ordinance No. 2016-23 (copy on file with the author). The Commission 
voted to stay enforcement of the new ordinance until April 1, 2017. Several residents have filed 
litigation challenging the ordinance. See Second Amended Complaint, Alford v. Walton County, No.: 
3:16-cv-00362-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2016) (alleging that the ordinance violates Plaintiff’s 
First Amendment rights). 
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reinforce the very simplistic-binary thinking that some property rights 
rhetoric promotes: the “it’s my property or it’s not” argument. This rhetoric 
tends to create hostility toward even reasonable and legitimate government 
regulations.300 In this case, regulation would very likely be necessary to 
protect the public’s clearly established rights of access to water and public 
trust lands, as well as rights acquired through customary use.301 Moreover, 
such an approach would increase the cost and decrease the options for local 
governments considering retreat as an option for adaptation.302 
Balanced against these arguments are littoral owners’ property rights. 
These fundamental rights deserve protection, and courts must consider 
seriously their contours and what protection is warranted. However, as 
illustrated above, allowing the property line to become move underwater is 
unlikely, ultimately, to serve landowners’ interests. Indeed, such an 
outcome would likely prove a pyrrhic victory in most cases.303 Moreover, 
there are avenues open to landowners who wish to protect their lands from 
erosion.304 For better or worse, Florida statutory law and current regulatory 
practice generally permit landowners to construct sea walls to protect their 
property against erosion.305 While that policy may be maladaptive,306 it 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 1106–08 (discussing the controversy between private coastal 
owners’ right to armor property and the public interest). 
 301. See United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding landowners’ 
armoring trespassed and interfered with tribal rights to tidelands). 
 302. See J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 272 (Michael Gerrard ed., 
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policy). 
 303. See Ruppert & Grimm, supra note 192, at 29, 30–32 (noting the eventual likelihood that it 
will become impossible or impracticable to maintain essential public services in many coastal areas 
subject to regular inundation). 
 304. CHARLES R. O’NEILL JR., STRUCTURAL METHODS FOR CONTROLLING COASTAL EROSION 
1–3 (1986), https://www.seagrant.umaine.edu/files/chg/nyexth86001.pdf (listing methods of coastal 
erosion control with corresponding advantages and disadvantages depending on location). 
 305. The Florida DEP may authorize installations such as seawalls, groins, and jetties upon 
consideration of facts and circumstances, including potential effects of the structures on the beach-dune 
system. The DEP may grant permits to protect private structures that are vulnerable to damage from 
frequent coastal storms. FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (2012). The DEP also issues permits allowing future 
installations on structures not yet vulnerable to damage, contingent upon the occurrence of specified 
changes to the coastal system that would render the structure vulnerable. Id. § 161.085(2)(b) (2009). In 
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properties with sea walls under what is known as the gap-closing provision. Id. § 161.085(2)(c). 
 306. Ruppert, supra note 31, at 75 (explaining Florida’s policy on rigid coastal armoring). 
Florida’s current rules require that sea walls be constructed only to withstand historic storm surges do 
short-sighted landowners no favors; it seems likely that owners who have constructed sea walls will find 
these eroded and overtopped in time. Urbina, supra note 148 (illustration shows an overtopped sea wall 
during a high tide in Isle of Palms, South Carolina). Destroyed sea walls could be seen along Florida’s 
northeast coast in September 2016 after Hurricane Matthew passed near to the coast (photos on file with 
author). 
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does provide landowners an avenue to protect their interests in advance of 
erosion. Allowing reasonable steps to protect coastal property before 
erosion seems preferable to a rule that would encourage landowners to 
reclaim after erosion has occurred. 
As a practical matter, reclamation, after erosion has submerged the 
property, is likely unaffordable and infeasible for most property owners 
absent governmental sponsorship and funding.307 Thus, if courts endorse a 
rule that fixes the property line notwithstanding sea-level rise, the right to 
use or to meaningfully control that property would likely be a hollow 
promise. 
Moreover, Florida statutory law provides additional protection for 
littoral landowners’ interests in adjacent submerged lands.308 Florida Statute 
§ 161.041 permits littoral landowners to seek permission to undertake 
activities on sovereign submerged lands for various purposes.309 This 
mechanism would remain available to littoral landowners, even if the 
boundary migrated. This preserves for landowners the only real value they 
retain after submersion: a right to use the submerged lands for various 
purposes connected with their littoral property, including protecting that 
property. This statutory mechanism provides a practical administrative 
framework consistent with the constitutional protections for sovereign 
lands, and incorporates some modest protections for the public interest.310 
Thus, a court can reconcile the common law of property and the 
constitutional and common law protections for sovereign submerged lands 
in a context of ongoing coastal erosion. A court may hold that, generally, 
the boundary of littoral lands should migrate with the MHWL. This will 
protect the public’s strong interest in retaining submerged lands in 
sovereign ownership, as well as avoid many practical problems that an 
alternate outcome would create. Ultimately, this will protect both the 
                                                                                                                 
 307. The cost of undertaking private beach restoration is one obstacle. Added to this, 
undertaking restoration on a single parcel will not be effective in many settings. Therefore, private 
landowners who wish to undertake this initiative without governmental leadership or support also face 
administrative and collective action obstacles. Where landowners have enormous wealth and a large 
investment in the property, or where the form of ownership already has a collective dimension, as in a 
large condominium or neighborhood association, this may prove more feasible. 
 308. FLA. STAT. § 161.041. 
 309. See id. (authorizing the Florida Department of Environmental Protection to grant coastal 
construction permits for construction of structures and physical activity, such as dredging of inlet 
channels or deposition of beach material on sovereignty lands below the mean high-water line); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 253.0347 (2017) (authorizing the lease of sovereign submerged lands for private 
residential docks and piers). 
 310. These protections include the requirement that the activity not interfere with the public use 
of any area of a beach seaward of the mean high-water line, or, if such interference is unavoidable, that 
the landowner provide alternate access. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 161.041, 161.085 (codifying permitting 
structures for individuals to protect their private property). 
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landowners’ and the public’s interests. The approach will free landowners 
from paying taxes on these lands while allowing them to use sovereign 
submerged lands when feasible, pursuant to the statutory framework. 
However, adopting a migratory boundary as the default rule does not 
need to exclude courts from considering fairness to landowners, albeit on a 
case-by-case basis. Because of the strong protections accorded to private 
property, a court must consider factors in individual cases that affect 
fairness.  
For example, the timing of the landowner’s investment relative to the 
pattern of erosion might be relevant to the court’s analysis. For a landowner 
who purchased the land before anyone knew that the area was critically 
eroding, and for whom loss of the property value would be significant, 
fairness might dictate allowing the boundary to remain fixed 
notwithstanding the public interest. However, if a landowner purchased the 
property or made substantial improvements after the likely impact of 
erosion and storm surges became evident, equity would be less in their 
favor. In such a case, the court will likely find that fairness did not require 
overriding the public interest.  
However, the availability of federally subsidized insurance and other 
support or options (such as offers from local or state governments to 
purchase rolling easements or other interests in the property) from state, 
federal, and local governments might similarly offset fairness concerns. 
This discussion concludes that public interest would, in most cases, 
outweigh fairness to individual landowners and, thus, require an ambulatory 
boundary in the context of sea-level rise. However, a court might balance 
interests differently and conclude that fairness to landowners outweighs the 
public interest in keeping sovereign lands. In such cases, the court will hold 
that fixed boundaries should remain, despite the practical concerns noted 
above. This would prioritize private property rights over public interest. A 
justification for this approach would be the strong protection given to 
private property, and the background rule that boundaries ordinarily remain 
fixed.311 
However, invoking the background rule regarding property boundaries 
is not an automatic trump. As noted above, this rule is already subject to 
numerous exceptions, sometimes in contexts that are arguably less 
compelling than this one.312 Common law recognizes exceptions allowing 
                                                                                                                 
 311. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (discussing the protections available to private 
landowners in property law).  
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in boundaries absent voluntary conveyance or eminent domain is already subject to numerous 
exceptions).  
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changes to boundaries and rules regarding the validity of titles to achieve 
values like fairness,313 productive use of land,314 and efficiency.315 In other 
contexts, property rights created by servitudes lose protection when 
circumstances change so significantly that the benefits of the covenant no 
longer accrue.316 
Moreover, as described above, applying the background rule creates 
substantial, practical problems. In many cases, activities on the newly 
submerged lands require not only permits under state law, but also federal 
permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act.317 Where state agencies may be 
more susceptible to local political pressure to grant permits to appease 
landowners, the Army Corps of Engineers might be less easily swayed by 
this pressure.318 In addition, the Corps’ more rigorous engineering and 
environmental standards and analysis would likely doom attempts by 
landowners to reclaim submerged property.319 
Moreover, the likelihood that more pervasive efforts to reclaim 
submerged areas will interfere with public access to water for recreation, 
navigation, and commerce means that landowners will “own” the land only 
in name, possessing few of the rights typically associated with property 
ownership.320 In this sense, fixing the coastal property boundary in the 
context of sea-level rise is more of a disservice to littoral landowners. Such 
a rule misleads purchasers, causing them to overestimate the nature of the 
rights they will have in the future as seas rise. In addition, encouraging 
landowners to think of permanently submerged lands as their property will 
generate conflict between the public and littoral landowners seeking to 
determine the bounds of their rights. 
For all these reasons, even if a court holds the ambulatory boundaries 
framework inapplicable, the court will likely adopt a default rule favoring 
                                                                                                                 
 313. For example, the common law protection of bona fide purchasers and its codification in 
recording statutes reflects a decision to achieve fairness at the expense of bedrock common law 
principles regarding the validity of title and the priority accorded an earlier transfer. POWELL, supra note 
6, § 82.01[3]. 
 314. For example, the doctrine of adverse possession requires actual use of the property for the 
designated statutory period, thus privileging productive use of land over non-use. 
 315. One value served by the concept of adverse possession is to ensure efficient allocation of 
land. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 6, § 91.01[4] n.30. 
 316. POWELL, supra note 6, § 66.02[2]. 
 317. FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (prohibiting construction of 
any physical structure on navigable waters unless the Army Corps of Engineers grants a permit). 
 318. David L. Hankey, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Erosion of 
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 319. Id. at 182–83. 
 320. See Sax, Sea Level Rising, supra note 5, at 644 (explaining that landowners making 
reclamation efforts have a duty to provide public access to the water). 
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an ambulatory boundary, absent a finding that fairness or the public interest 
necessitates a fixed boundary. Adopting a default rule is an important step 
in creating clarity and consistency in the application of the law. At the same 
time, adopting a default rule, rather than an absolute rule, acknowledges the 
tension inherent in reconciling these two bodies of law (the ambulatory 
boundaries framework and the constitutional, statutory, and common laws) 
and the values they protect. Thus, it leaves room for courts to deviate from 
the default rule when fairness to the individual landowner or the public 
interest dictates as much. 
This approach—sweeping away the ambulatory boundaries 
framework—while bold, has the merit of creating clarity long sought by 
litigants, courts, and commentators. Given the challenges all parties will 
face in efforts to adapt to sea-level rise, clearing away the debris and 
clarifying the question of boundaries frees resources to address questions 
more meaningful than whether an unaided human eye can observe the 
changes on the coastline as they occurred. However, even if non-application 
of the framework is justified under basic principles of common law, courts 
will likely hesitate to make a decision that could be characterized as a 
change in the law, rather than a mere change in the facts (which affects the 
determination of what law applies).321 
D. Objections to the Proposal to Set Aside the Ambulatory Boundaries 
Framework in the Context of Sea-level Rise 
The sections above outline two approaches courts might take in 
recognizing the legal significance of sea-level rise and adapting the law. 
However, because the second of these—a decision not to apply the erosion-
avulsion doctrine—represents a decisive change in long-standing precedent, 
it would inevitably draw scrutiny and face serious challenges.322 Moreover, 
as noted above, courts are rightly reluctant to take steps that could be 
characterized as changing the common law.323 This section addresses some 
of these concerns. Although common law property doctrines are notoriously 
sticky and criticized for their adherence to antiquated rules, courts and 
judges have long recognized that they are not required to adhere to rules 
when circumstances have changed, particularly when applying the older 
                                                                                                                 
 321. See Jones, supra note 247, at 457–58 (explaining that courts prefer to distinguish old 
rulings rather than overrule prior decisions). 
 322. See id. at 457–58 (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and its binding effect on lower 
court decisions).   
 323. See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 722 (2010) (discussing the potential judicial elimination of common law private property rights). 
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doctrines, which no longer serve their purposes.324 In Riddle v. Harmon, a 
California Court of Appeals rejected the rule that a joint tenant of real estate 
could not transfer property to herself as tenant in common without use of a 
straw person.325 The court highlighted that the rule against allowing a joint 
tenant to transfer to herself as a tenant in common was premised on the 
anachronistic practice of livery of seisin as the means of conveyance.326 
Changes in the means of conveyance made the prohibition on transfer of an 
interest to oneself anachronistic.327 The court also highlighted that the rule 
aligned with common sense and efficiency, as well as effectuating the intent 
of the grantor.328 The court cited the famous lines from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s The Path of the Law: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.329 
In Garner v. Gerrish, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the rule 
that a lease at the will of the lessee must also be at the will of the lessor.330  
It noted that the rule was generally accepted throughout the United States in 
the 19th Century, but nevertheless rejected it.331 Like the “straw man” in 
Riddle v. Harmon, the court emphasized the rule’s link to the obsolete 
practice of livery of seisin, and noted that the rule had been criticized for 
violating terms of the agreement and frustrating the intent of the parties.332 
 Throughout the 20th century, courts rejected or revised a number of 
common law doctrines in the realm of landlord-tenant law that became 
obsolete because of the changes in the world around them. The archaic 
rules fit poorly with the social values recognized as important in property 
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law.333 For example, courts rejected self-help as a remedy because it 
induced violent conflict and deprived landlords of adequate judicial 
remedies.334 Similarly,  the implied warranty of habitability was first 
adopted in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation.335 Numerous states 
adopted it later, recognizing changes in the landlord-tenant relationship in 
20th century society.336 In other words, implicit factual assumptions about 
the nature of the housing tenants sought, their ability to perform necessary 
repairs, and the relative bargaining power of landlords and tenants that 
underlay the doctrine were no longer warranted.337 
Similarly, in real estate transactions, state courts have steadily rejected 
the doctrine of caveat emptor, and moved to impose a duty to disclose 
latent defects on sellers of real property.338 State courts criticized the old 
rule as allowing conduct that violates fair dealing and good faith. A number 
of the courts revisiting the doctrines recognized that there were relevant 
doctrinal forces beyond the rule in question. In some cases, this included 
doctrines, principles, or values drawn from contract or tort law.339 
Similarly, a court setting aside the ambulatory boundaries framework could 
acknowledge the importance of constitutional and common law principles, 
and values associated with protecting the public trust and the sovereign 
ownership of submerged lands in determining coastal boundaries in an era 
of sea-level rise.340 
There is also precedent for courts incorporating recognition of changed 
circumstances into substantive property doctrine.341 For example, changed 
circumstances are one of the accepted rationales for arguing that a real 
covenant or equitable servitude should be terminated.342 Courts recognize 
that even though a real covenant or servitude is an interest in land, it cannot 
survive substantial changes that make the area no longer suitable for the 
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uses envisioned by the restriction.343 Moreover, the scope of easements has 
been allowed to change and expand to reflect gradual evolution in 
technology.344 All of these rules have developed to allow property law to 
adapt when changes external to the law affect the law’s ability to achieve its 
goals.345 Here, the law governing ambulatory boundaries faces serious 
challenges, not only because of its inherent limitations, but also because 
changes external to the law have redefined and broadened the scope of the 
interests at stake. 
Nonetheless, one might distinguish all of these instances by 
highlighting that the changes resulting from sea-level rise are not mere 
changes in remedy or recognition of a property owner’s new duty. Instead, 
they are changes that affect the very method by which courts will determine 
coastal boundaries.346  
One response to this concern is that coastal boundaries are already 
ambulatory.347 Landowners currently take property subject to a set of rules 
that are sufficiently arcane and vague that few likely understand the process 
by which their boundaries are determined.348 Moreover, these rules make 
future boundaries entirely unpredictable, dependent as they are on the 
vagaries of the ocean.349 Thus, the idea that landowners have somehow 
relied on the existing doctrine and should be protected in that reliance is a 
weak claim.350 Moreover, property law is no stranger to doctrines that can 
effect equally if not more significant changes to an owner’s rights—for 
example, the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription.351 
A final concern that eliminating the ambulatory boundaries framework 
raises is the risk that a court would consider this as changing the common 
law in a way that would justify a claim of a “judicial taking,” or a 
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deprivation of property without due process.352 This only seems a risk with 
the comprehensive approach outlined above.Moreover, courts have yet to 
adopt a judicial takings theory. However, four of the eight Justices on the 
Supreme Court at the close of the Obama Administration indicated support 
for such a theory.353 It is impossible to predict what such a doctrine would 
look like, given that it does not exist. If the Court adopted the approach laid 
out by the late Justice Scalia, in a portion of the Stop the Beach 
Renourishment opinion joined by Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas, a 
judicial taking would be found if a court “recharacterize[d] as public 
property what was previously private property.”354 Justice Kennedy, in an 
opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, noted that the common law tradition 
allows “incremental modifications to property law . . . .”355 His opinion 
highlighted problems with the judicial takings theory and noted the 
constraints already imposed by the due process clause, which prevents state 
courts from eliminating or substantially changing “established property 
rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner,”356 or abandoning 
settled principles.357 Applying these as the test for judicial taking, one can 
argue that setting aside the ambulatory boundaries framework in the context 
of sea-level rise does not recharacterize property, change established 
property rights, or abandon settled principles.358 
First, as noted above, deciding whether facts have changed in 
materially relevant ways, such that a body of law is not the applicable rule 
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of decision, does not change the law. It merely determines the proper law to 
apply, which is a fundamental judicial role.359 
Second, this article’s premise is that the changing nature of the 
environment—not the courts—has unsettled the law. As John Echeverria 
noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the common law 
can and does change, and that changed circumstances can justify such 
evolution in the law.360 The argument for not applying the ambulatory 
boundaries framework is precisely that circumstances have changed. 
Third, it is important to recall that coastal property boundaries are not 
settled under existing law.361 Those who own land at the water’s edge 
already are and have always been subject to boundaries that change when 
the ocean moves.362 Thus, landowners cannot claim to have a fixed 
expectation to own property at the water’s edge in the future.363 A court 
seeking to apply law in new circumstances is clarifying the law, not 
changing it.364 Thus, as Michael Wolf emphasizes, the incoherent and 
confusing state of the common law in this area works against a judicial 
takings claim under the plurality opinion’s analysis.365 Added to that, the 
presumption that most states favor the accretion-erosion doctrines means 
that upon inundation, the boundary presumptively moves, and inundated 
areas become public.366 A judicial decision stating that this framework no 
longer applies inevitably does not help or hurt any particular landowner. 
More importantly, the root cause of any change to the property owner’s 
rights is not the judicial decision, but a documented force of nature that has 
always been recognized as having the power to trigger legal changes: 
inundation of property.367 Finally, the leading treatise writers suggest that 
the ambulatory boundaries doctrines may simply be rules of construction, 
not positive rules of law for the ascertainment of boundaries.368 If a court 
adopts this view, the rules have even less force. A claim of a property right 
grounded in a rule of construction would seem weaker than one grounded in 
a rule of law. Thus, even the specter of a judicial takings claim does not 
preclude a court from seeking to adapt the law in this area. 
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CONCLUSION 
The common law framework for ambulatory boundaries developed to 
address changes in the shoreline that were perceived as unpredictable, 
bidirectional, and episodic, with limited geographic extent. This paper 
argues that cases of coastal erosion in an era of predictable, ongoing, 
unidirectional, and pervasive sea-level rise are materially different from 
those that justified applying the ambulatory boundaries framework. It 
further claims that the rationales supporting application of these doctrines 
from their earliest common law expression to today do not support their 
application in this new setting. 
Courts may respond by applying the ambulatory boundaries framework 
with explicit consideration of how sea-level rise necessitates changes in the 
doctrines in order to align the law with the rationales that support the 
framework. Alternatively, courts may conclude that the framework is 
inapplicable in this new setting, and then apply the substantial remaining 
body of law that governs property boundaries and ownership, and control of 
public trust and sovereign submerged lands—without the overlay of the 
erosion-avulsion framework. This body of law, composed of constitutional, 
statutory, and common law doctrines, will provide ample guidance for 
courts in the absence of the ambulatory boundaries framework. This article 
suggests that courts should consider these options in order to better align 
the law with the reality of a coastline increasingly shaped by sea-level rise. 
